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1 Introduction
The line of research initiated by Dasgupta & Maskin (1986) and continued, amongst
others, by Reny (1999) has been successful in obtaining equilibrium existence results
for nite-player games with discontinuous payo functions. In this paper we extend
this approach to the context of generalized games with a measure space of players, a
class of games rst considered by Schmeidler (1973), the state of the art now set by
Balder (2002). In particular, concerning existence of Nash equilibrium, we bring the
branch of game theory dealing with games with a measure space of players on par with
that dealing in a systematic way with games with discontinuous payo functions.1,2
Apart from obtaining a unication of important recent game-theoretic results
on a general level, a motivation for our analysis is that several economic problems
which are addressed in the literature can be modeled as games with a continuum
of players, but where payo functions need not be continuous, and need not even
satisfy the assumptions in Balder (2002). As an example, we will consider a version
of Mirrlees's (1971) model of optimal taxation (see Section 9).
Our approach to deal with discontinuous payo functions in the setting of games
with a measure space of players is based on the notion of multiply security, which was
developed in the context of nite-player games by McLennan, Monteiro & Tourky
(2011). More precisely, we take a version of this notion, called continuous security,
which was introduced by Barelli & Meneghel (2013), and adapt it to the particular
measurability needs arising when there may be a continuum of players. We remark
that the notion of multiply security generalizes that of better-reply security, which
was introduced in the pioneering paper of Reny (1999).
Based on the notion of continuous security, our result covers, in particular, games
where, as in Balder (2002), payo functions are assumed to be upper semi-continuous
and the value functions of the players are assumed to be lower semi-continuous.3 In
fact, when value functions are assumed to be lower semi-continuous, it covers games
with payo functions that are merely weakly upper semi-continuous (as dened in
Carmona (2009)).
In addition to the pure strategy existence result of Balder (2002), our result ex-
tends that of Khan & Sun (1999). The approaches of Balder (2002) and Khan & Sun
(1999) dier in the way how a convexifying eect of aggregation is ensured to deal
1Further papers on existence of equilibrium with a measure space of players include Barelli &
Duggan (2012), Carmona & Podczeck (2009), Khan (1986), Khan, Rath & Sun (1997), Khan & Sun
(1999), Martins da Rocha & Topuzu (2008), Mas-Colell (1984), Páscoa (1993), and Rath (1996).
2Recent papers on nite-player games with discontinuous payo functions include Bagh & Jofre
(2006), Balder (2011), Bich (2009), Bich & Laraki (2012), Carmona (2011), Carmona (2012), de Cas-
tro (2011), Nessah (2011), Prokopovych (2011), Prokopovych (2013), Reny (2009), Reny (2011), and
Reny (2013).
3See Section 4.1 for the formal denition of the value function of a player.
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with a continuum of negligible players with non-convex action sets. In Balder (2002)
it is assumed in this respect that the payo of each player may depend on the actions
of the other players only through a nite-dimensional vector of summary statistics.
In Khan & Sun (1999), on the other hand, the entire distribution of the actions of the
players may matter for payos, but the non-atomicity hypothesis on the measure on
the space of players is strengthened. Our result will show that the same strengthening
of non-atomicity still allows to obtain pure-strategy Nash equilibria, with non-convex
action sets and payo dependence modeled as in Khan & Sun (1999), when, dierently
to Khan & Sun (1999), payo functions need not be continuous.
The paper is organized as follows. We present a motivating example in Section 2.
Some notation and terminology is introduced in Section 3. In Section 4 we present the
general model and our notion of continuous security. Section 5 contains the statements
of our main existence results. The relationship between these results and the pure
strategy existence result of Balder (2002) is detailed in Section 6. In Section 7, a special
case of the general model is presented. In this special case, each player's payo is
explicitly modeled to depend on his choice, on the choices of the atomic players,
and on the vector of the joint distributions of the actions and players' attributes
appearing in each one of countably many sub-populations of the atomless players.
Sucient conditions for continuous security are presented in Section 8. Section 9
applies our results to several optimal income taxation problems. In Section 10 we
make some concluding remarks. The proofs of our results are in Section 11.
2 A motivating example
Consider a large population of individuals who live at dierent points in a geographical
space and face the following problem. Each individual needs to take one of two bridges
to reach his oce. His goal is to minimize the total travel time between his home and
his oce; if he does not arrive on time for a meeting, there is an additional cost
resulting from, say, extra time needed to schedule another meeting, or from the loss
of a protable trade. The optimal choice of any individual depends on the choice of
all others through their inuence on the congestion of the two bridges.
To make the example specic, assume that the population is described by a prob-
ability space (T;; ) where T is the unit interval [0; 1] and  is Lebesgue measure.
Each individual is identied by his address, i.e., individual t lives at geographical
point t 2 [0; 1], and has to choose one of two bridges, 1 or 2; thus, there is a common
action set A = fa1; a2g, where ai means choosing bridge i, i = 1; 2. Bridge 1 is located
geographically at t1 = 1=3, and bridge 2 at t2 = 2=3.
The relative frequencies with which the bridges are used are described by the vector
y = (y1; y2) in the unit simplex of R2. Assume that the time spent by individual t on
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the journey from home to work through bridge i is gt(x; y) = (1 + y
i)jt  tij, i = 1; 2.
The amount of time individual t takes on his journey must be less than m > 0 for
him to arrive on time for the meeting. His payo is 1 if he arrives on time, but if he
misses the meeting, he suers a cost c > 0 implying that his payo is 1  c. Thus, let
individual t's payo function be dened by setting, for each x 2 A and y 2 ,
ut(x; y) =
(
1 if gt(x; y) < m;
1  c otherwise:
A strategy prole is a measurable map f : T ! A. Given such a strategy prole f ,
let e(f) = (e1(f); e2(f)) 2  denote the relative frequencies with which the bridges
are used, i.e., ei(f) = (ft 2 T : f(t) = aig), i = 1; 2. The payo of individual t is
then ut(f(t); e(f)). We have thus a game where for each player (alias individual)
the payo is determined by the own action and the frequency distribution of the
actions chosen by all players. We say that a strategy prole f is a Nash equilibrium
if, for almost every t 2 T , ut(f(t); e(f)) = maxfut(x; e(f)) : x 2 Ag.
Of course, for small values of m, each player's payo function has discontinuity
points. However, for any (x; y) 2 A, the set of those players whose payo function
is discontinuous at this point is negligible (in fact, for any (x; y) 2 A , there are
at most two such players). In Section 11.4.3 we shall show that this property implies
that our main result applies to yield the existence of a Nash equilibrium.
Some points are worth noting. First, the game is nothing else than a particular
case of the situation considered in Theorem 2 of Schmeidler (1973), departing by
just relaxing the continuity assumption in this latter result. Second, even though this
departure is rather mild, the game is not covered by the results in Balder (2002),
which would yield equilibrium existence in case that, for almost all t 2 T , ut is upper
semi-continuous and the value function wt, given by wt(y) = maxx2A ut(x; y), is lower
semi-continuous. In fact, in the above game, no player has an upper semi-continuous
payo function, so Balder's results cannot be applied.
Of course, the above example can easily be modied so that each player's payo
function is upper semi-continuous, but then the resulting value functions may fail to
be lower semi-continuous, and Balder's results still cannot be applied. For instance, let
ut(x; y) =
(
1 if gt(x; y)  m;
1  c otherwise:
Now it is in fact possible that, for a non-negligible subset of players, the value functions
are not lower semi-continuous. This can be illustrated as follows: Let m = 1=2, which
implies that jt 2=3j > m for all t 2 [0; 1=6). Now, for any y 2 , a player t 2 [0; 1=6)
can obtain a payo of 1 only if he reaches his oce in time by using bridge 1, i.e., if
1=3 t  m=(1+y1). Fix t 2 [0; 1=12) and let y 2  be such that 1=3 t = m=(1+y1).
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Then wt(y) = 1 but wt(y
0) = 1   c for all y0 2  with y01 > y1 and thus wt is not
lower semi-continuous.
To conclude, the above example presents a simple and mild departure from the
setting considered in Schmeidler (1973), but which is not covered by the available
existence results for large games. A more pronounced departure from the assumption
of continuous payo functions made in Schmeidler (1973) is presented in the optimal
taxation framework considered in Section 9.
3 General notation and terminology
In this section we introduce notation and terminology needed for the setup of our
model and for the formulation of the results. Additional notation and terminology
used in the proofs can be found in the beginning of Section 11.
(a) ' : A B denotes a correspondence from the set A to the set B, i.e., a map
from A to the power set of B.
(b) We use usc as abbreviation for upper semi-continuous, lsc for lower semi-
continuous, and uhc for upper hemi-continuous.
(c) If A and B are topological spaces, a correspondence ' : A  B is called
well-behaved if it is uhc and takes non-empty and closed values.
(d) For a topological space X, B(X) denotes the Borel -algebra of X.
(e) A topological space X is called a Souslin space if it is Hausdor and if there is
a continuous surjection from a Polish space onto X (see Schwartz (1973, Chapter II)).
(f) We will often work with the narrow topology on a set Z of Borel measures on a
completely regular Souslin space X. Recall that the narrow topology on such a set Z
is the smallest topology on Z such that for every continuous bounded f : X ! R the
map  7! R
X
fd,  2 Z, is continuous. (Cf. Schwartz (1973, p. 249)).
(g) Products of measurable spaces are always regarded as being endowed with the
product -algebra, and subsets of measurable spaces with the subspace -algebra.
(h) If A and B are as in (c), and (T;; ) is a measure space, we call a corre-
spondence ' : T A B a Caratheodory correspondence if '(t; ) is well behaved for
each t 2 T , and if for each a 2 A, the graph of '(; a) is measurable, i.e., belongs to

 B(B).
(i) Given functions f : X ! Y and g : X ! Z, we denote by (f; g) the function
x 7! (f(x); g(x)) : X ! Y  Z.
(j) coE denotes the convex hull of a subset E of a topological linear space.
(k) A measure space (T;; ) is called non-trivial nite if 0 < (T ) < 1, and is
called complete if every -null set in T belongs to .
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(l) A measure space (T;; ) is called separable if L1() (with its usual norm) is
separable. We will also say that a measure  0 on a set T 0 is separable to mean that
(T 0;0;  0) is separable if 0  2T 0 is the domain of  0.
(m) A measure space (T;; ) is called super-atomless if for every E 2  with
(E) > 0, the subspace of L1() consisting of the elements of L1() vanishing o E
is non-separable. (For equivalent denitions, see Podczeck (2009).) We also say that
a measure  0 on a set T 0 is super-atomless to mean that (T 0;0;  0) is super-atomless
if 0  2T 0 is the domain of  0.
Remark 1. Note that a measure space (T;; ) is atomless if and only if for every
E 2  with (E) > 0, the subspace of L1() consisting of the elements of L1() van-
ishing o E is innite-dimensional. In view of this, it is clear that super-atomless is
a property which is stronger than atomless. It is well known that the unit interval
with Lebesgue measure is an atomless and separable measure space. Being separable,
this measure space is not super-atomless. Examples of super-atomless measure space
are atomless Loeb measure spaces or f0; 1gI with the usual coin-ipping product mea-
sure when I is uncountable. Furthermore, as follows from Fremlin (2008, Proposition
521P(b)), Lebesgue measure on the unit interval can be extended to a super-atomless
probability measure (see Podczeck (2009)).
4 The model
The game-theoretic model we consider is based on (the pure strategy part of) that of
Balder (2002, Section 2.2). In 4.1.14.1.6 below, we introduce the part of our model
that is common with the model of Balder (2002), and we will be rather brief there.
Some comments and a simple example which may be helpful for the reader may be
found in 4.1.7. Those assumptions in the pure strategy Nash equilibrium existence
result in Balder (2002) which we do not included in the setup of our general model
may be found in Section 6.
The essential and innovative step in setting up our model is the adaption of the
nite-player game notion of continuous security to a context with a measure space of
players. The development will be done in Section 4.3.
Following Schmeidler (1973) and Balder (2002), we allow for games with non-
convex action sets. The presentation and discussion of the assumptions we make to
deal with this aspect of our model is separated in Section 4.2.
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4.1 The basic model
4.1.1 Players
There is a measure space (T;; ) of players. The measure space (T;; ) may be
non-atomic or purely atomic, or may have both an atomic part and a non-atomic
part. This allows for non-atomic games as well as for nite-player games as special
cases, and in particular covers situations with nitely many large, i.e., atomic players
and a continuum of negligible players. Of course, depending on whether a player is
atomic or negligible, dierent assumptions on his characteristics, i.e., action sets and
payo functions, may be appropriate (see Section 4.1.3 below). To accommodate this,
the players in Balder's (2002) model are grouped into two measurable sets T and T^ ,
with T \ T^ = ; and T [ T^ = T , where, to follow Balder's (2002) notation, T is taken
to contain the atomic players.
The following is supposed to hold.
(A1) (T;; ) is a complete non-trivial nite measure space.
4.1.2 Actions
Action sets of players are subsets of a universe X where
(A2) X is a Souslin locally convex topological vector space.
Recall from Section 3(e) that a topological space X is called Souslin if it is Hausdor
and if there is a continuous surjection from a Polish space onto X. Thus any Polish
space is a Souslin space. Examples of locally convex spaces that matter in several
economic models and which are Souslin but not Polish are separable Banach spaces
with the weak topology and duals of separable Banach spaces with the weak topology.
The action set of player t 2 T is denoted by Xt, and by  G we denote the graph
of the action sets correspondence t 7! Xt. It is assumed:
(A3) (i) For each t 2 T , the action set Xt is a non-empty compact subset of X.
(ii)  G is a measurable subset of T X, i.e., belongs to 
 B(X).
A strategy prole is a measurable map f : T ! X such that f(t) 2 Xt for almost
all t 2 T . By SG we denote the set of all strategy proles in the game G. Thus SG is
just the set of all measurable a.e. selections of the action sets correspondence t 7! Xt.
4.1.3 Externality
The externality of a strategy prole species the aggregate via which the strategy
prole aects each player. In nite player games, the strategy prole itself is usually
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taken for the externality. In non-atomic games, on the other hand, following Schmei-
dler (1973, Theorem 2), it is common to take some statistics of a strategy prole, like
mean or distribution, for the externality, so as to get some convexifying eect of large
numbers which allows to dispense with the convexity assumptions on action sets and
payo functions which are made in nite player games. In Balder's (2002) model the
two approaches above are integrated in the following way.
Recall rst that the set T of players is partitioned into two measurable subsets T
and T^ . For the players in T , which may be atoms for , the convexity assumption on
action sets made in nite-player games is retained:
(A4) Xt is convex for every t 2 T .
For players in T^ , this assumption is not made and is assumed that
(A5) T^ is included in the non-atomic part of (T;; ).
Now the externality of a strategy prole is specied as follows. Let SG = ff j T : f 2 SGg
be the set of the restrictions of the elements of SG to T , or, in other words, the set
of all strategy proles of the players in T . In addition, let C^ be a countable set of
functions q :  G\ (T^ X)! R such that (i) q is measurable (recall Section 3(g)), (ii)
q(t; ) is continuous for each t 2 T^ , (iii) there is an integrable function q : T^ ! R+
such that supfjq(t; x)j : x 2 Xtg  q(t) for each t 2 T^ . Let e : SG ! SG be given by
e(f) = f j T , and e^ : SG ! RC^ by e^(f) = h
R
T^
q(t; f(t))d(t)iq2C^. Note that the integrals
are indeed dened. Now dene e : SG ! SG  RC^ by setting e(f) = (e(f); e^(f)) for
each f 2 SG. The map e is the externality map of the game. Thus, given a strategy
prole f , the externality e(f) is the restriction of f to T together with the statistics
e^(f) summarizing the actions of the players in T^ .
Let EG  SG RC^ denote the image of SG under e, i.e., EG = e(SG). We call the
set EG the externality set or externality space of a game G.
We note that in Balder (2002) it is actually assumed that the set C^ is nite. We will
formally state this as a condition in Section 4.2 below, where also a strengthening of
(A5) is presented which gives a convexifying eect of large numbers when C^ is allowed
to be countably innite.
The reason for us to allow C^ to be countably innite is to cover games where,
following Mas-Colell (1984), action sets may be uncountable and the externality of a
strategy prole is taken to be its distribution, rather than just a nite-dimensional
summary statistics. The link between setting up the externality of strategy proles
as in this section and setting up it directly in terms of distributions is explored in a
detailed way in Section 7. In that section we show that, actually, with C^ allowed to be
countably innite, the way the externality of strategy proles is modeled by Balder
(2002) is far more general than just being able to cover their distributions, and thus
turns out to be an ecient and very exible device.
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4.1.4 Topology on the externality set
The set EG is given a topology specied as follows. First, the set SG is given the feeble
topology. Recall from Balder (2002) that the feeble topology on SG is the coarsest
topology such that the map h 7! R T q(t; h(t))d(t) : SG ! R is continuous for each
q 2 G, where G is the set of all functions q : T X ! R such that (i) q is measurable,
(ii) q(t; ) is linear and continuous for each t 2 T , (iii) there is an integrable function
q : T ! R+ such that supfjq(t; x)j : x 2 Xtg  q(t) for each t 2 T . Second, RC^ is
given the product topology dened from the usual topology of R. Now EG is given
the subspace topology dened from the product topology of SG  RC^.
The proofs of the existence results in Balder (2002) require the externality space
to be sequential, i.e., that a sequentially closed subset be closed. In Balder (2002) this
is guaranteed by assuming that the measure space (T;; ) of players is separable.
Actually, the following assumption suces (see Lemma 3 in the proofs section below).
(A6) The subspace measure on T dened from  is separable.
We will assume just (A6) because the strengthening of (A5) we will consider in Section
4.2 is incompatible with assuming the entire space (T;; ) to be separable. Of course,
(A6) holds automatically if T is the union of atoms, and in particular, if the set T is
countable.
4.1.5 Payo functions and constraint correspondences
Each player t 2 T has a payo function ut : Xt  EG ! [ 1;+1]. Thus, given a
strategy prole f 2 SG, player t's payo is determined by his own action f(t) and by
the externality e(f).
In addition to the payo function, for each player t 2 T there is a constraint
correspondence At : EG  Xt. The set At(y) species the actions that are actually
available for player t given the externality y 2 EG. As elements of EG represent
social outcomes given choices of all players, the set At(y) can be viewed as a socially
constrained action set of player t given y 2 EG.
The specication of payo functions and constraint correspondences given here
is exactly as in Balder (2002). At a rst glance, one may have an interpretational
problem with these specications. Indeed, for a player t in T , a given value of the
externality determines his action, so one may ask for the meaning of At(e(f)) as a
choice set as well as for the meaning of ut(x; e(f)) if x 6= f(t). The problem is easily
resolved, though. We simply assume for the players in T (as suggested in Balder
(2002, Section 2.4), and in conformity with what is standard in nite-player games)
that payo functions and constraint correspondences have factorizations so that, for
a player t 2 T , ut(x; y) can be written as vt(x; t(y)), and At(y) as Bt(t(y)), where
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the function t does not depend on the coordinate of y referring to t, i.e., t(y)
does not specify anything about the action chosen by t; see Remark 4 for details.
However, this issue will not play any role in the arguments concerning existence of
Nash equilibrium, and therefore, as in Balder (2002), we do not state an explicit
assumption in this respect. Note also that for players in T^ , this issue does not arise
at all under (A5). Indeed, (A5) means that players in T^ are negligible, so by the
denition of the externality of a strategy prole the particular choice of an action
by an individual player in T^ has no impact on the value of the externality, i.e., for
players in T^ , externality and action are independent of each other.
4.1.6 Nash equilibrium
We summarize a game as just outlined by a list G = ((T;; ); X; hXt; ut; Atit2T ; e).
Given such a game G, we denote by wt the value function of player t 2 T ; that is,
wt : EG ! [ 1;+1] is the function dened by setting
wt(y) = supfut(x; y) : x 2 At(y)g; y 2 EG:
A strategy prole f is called a Nash equilibrium (for short, an equilibrium) of the
game G if f(t) 2 At(e(f)) and ut(f(t); e(f)) = wt(e(f)) for almost all t 2 T .
4.1.7 Remarks
Remark 2. The model described in this section is intended as a general framework
that can encompass several simpler models. This point has been emphasized in Balder
(2002). In this line, we show in Section 7 that the class of games where each player's
payo depends on the own action and the distribution of the actions of all players
(considered in Schmeidler (1973) and Mas-Colell (1984)) is included in the framework
of this section. The following example shows this for the game in Section 2.
Example 1. Let G = ((T;; ); A; hutit2T ) be the game described in Section 2; in
particular, the action set A of all players t 2 T is the set A = fa1; a2g and the payo
functions ut are dened on A   where  is the unit simplex in R2. To represent
this game in the setting of this section, keep the probability space (T;; ) as the
space of players, let X = R, view A as a subset of R, and for all t 2 T , let Xt = A.
Now  G = T  A. Dene functions qi :  G ! R, i = 1; 2, by setting
qi(t; x) =
(
1 if x = ai
0 otherwise.
Let T^ = T , and let e : SG ! R2 be the externality map dened from C^ = fq1; q2g.
Write ei for the ith coordinate function of e, i = 1; 2. Note that for any f 2 SG,
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ei(f) = (ft 2 T : f(t) = aig). In particular, because (T;; ) is a probability space,
we have EG  e(SG) = , and thus we have the payo function ut dened on XtEG
for each t 2 T . Finally, for each t 2 T , let At(y) = A for all y 2 EG. Now we have
a game G = ((T;; ); X; hXt; ut; Atit2T ; e) in terms of this section. It is clear that
(A1)-(A6) are satised (note that T = ;, and that Lebesgue measure is complete and
atomless). It is also clear that a Nash equilibrium of the game G is an equilibrium in
the sense demanded in the context of Section 2.
Remark 3. Assuming that all the action sets are included in the same Souslin locally
convex space X is not a big restriction. Indeed, suppose for instance that, for two
Souslin locally convex spaces X0 and X1, we have Xt  X0 for all t 2 T and Xt  X1
for all t 2 T^ , without imposing any relationship between X0 and X1. In this case, we
can set X = X0X1 and identify with X0 with the subspace X0f0g of X, and X1
with the subspace f0g  X1, noting that the product of two locally convex Souslin
spaces is again a space of this kind (directly from the denition of such spaces).
In fact, it suces to assume that X1 is just a completely regular Souslin space
(without imposing any linear structure on X1). The reasons are the following. First,
no convexity assumptions are made with respect to the players in T^ . Second, if X1 is
a completely regular Souslin space then, writing M(X1) for the space of all bounded
signed Borel measures on X1 with the narrow topology, M(X1) is a locally convex
Souslin space (Schwartz (1973, p. 387, Corollary)) and the identication of the points
in X1 with the corresponding Dirac measures denes a homeomorphic embedding
of X1 into M(X1).
Remark 4. Here is a more detailed description of the assumption sketched in the last
paragraph of 4.1.5. We will look only at payo functions. Constraint correspondences
can be dealt with similarly.
Consider rst the special case where T is countable and ftg 2  for each t 2 T . In
this case, SG is the same as
Q
t2 T Xt. Write t for the projection of
Q
t02 T Xt0RC^ ontoQ
t02 TnftgXt0  RC^. Now the assumption is that for each t 2 T the payo function ut
is such that ut(x; y) = vt(x; t(y)) for any x 2 Xt and y 2 EG, where vt is a function
dened on Xtt(EG). Of course, for any t 2 T , t does not depend on the coordinate
of y referring to t.
As for the general case, choose a partition of T into measurable sets F and Ek,
k 2 K, so that  is atomless on F and each Ek is an atom for . (Note that in
general an atom need not be a singleton.) For an element g 2 SG, write g for the
-equivalence class of g in the space of measurable functions from T to X, and let SG
be the set of all these equivalence classes. Dene  : SG  RC^ ! SG  RC^ by setting
(y) = (g; h); y = (g; h) 2 SG  RC^:
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Further, for each k 2 K, let SkG be the set of restrictions of the elements of SG to
T nEk, and dene k : SG  RC^ ! SkG  RC^ by setting
k(y) = (gj TnEk ; h); y = (g; h) 2 SG  RC^:
Now our assumption is that for a player t belonging to T the payo function ut
satises ut(x; y) = vt(x; t(y)) for every x 2 Xt and y 2 EG, where t =  if t 2 F
and t = k if t 2 Ek, k 2 K, and where vt is a function dened on Xt  t(EG).
Again, for any t 2 T , t does not depend on the coordinate of y referring to t. If
t 2 Ek for some k 2 K, this is clear. For t 2 F , just note that ftg is a -null set as 
is atomless on F , so for any g 2 SG, g(t) is not determined by g.
Remark 5. One may think of the players in T as large atomic players, because, as
in nite player games, action sets of these players are assumed to be convex. But in
the literature there are also contexts to which Balder's (2002) model applies with T
being included in the non-atomic part of the space of players. E.g., in Kim & Yannelis
(1997) and Yannelis (2009), non-atomic games are considered where, besides of the
own action, the payo of each player may vary with the equal almost everywhere-
equivalence class of strategy proles, rather than just with a summary statistics. It is
assumed in these games that action sets of the players are convex. Thus, with T = T
and  non-atomic, Balder's (2002) model covers such games (cf. the previous remark).
Remark 6. If T is countable and ftg 2  for each t 2 T , then SG is the same asQ
t2 T Xt. Moreover, if (ftg) > 0 and the action set Xt is compact for each t 2 T ,
then the feeble topology on SG is the same as the product topology on
Q
t2 T Xt. This
is so for two reasons. First, compactness of Xt means that the weak topology of the
locally convex space X coincides on Xt with the given topology of X; thus a net hxi
in Xt converges to some x 2 Xt if and only if p(x)! p(x) for each continuous linear
function p : X ! R. Second, if ftg 2  and Xt is compact for each t 2 T , then, for
any such p, the function q : T X ! R, where q(t; ) = p for one t 2 T and q(t; ) is
the zero functional elsewhere in T , belongs to the set G in the denition of the feeble
topology. Thus, given that (ftg) > 0 for each t 2 T , it follows that if a net hhi in
SG converges to some h 2 SG for the feeble topology, then it converges to this h for
the product topology of
Q
t2 T Xt. In view of (iii) in the denition of G, it is clear that
the reverse implication also holds, given that T is countable.
Remark 7. The model presented above contains the standard (normal-form) model
of nite-player games as a special case (as long as action sets are contained in locally
convex Souslin spaces). Indeed, suppose for the measure space (T;; ) of players that
T is nite,  = 2T , and  is the counting measure. Set T = T . Then SG = SG and
thus, by what was noted in the previous remark, SG is the same as
Q
t2T Xt and the
feeble topology on SG is the same as the product topology on
Q
t2T Xt. Concerning
the payo functions, we refer to the second paragraph of Remark 4.
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4.2 Convexifying eect of large numbers
As said in 4.1.3, a motivation to consider non-atomic games with the externality of
strategy proles being dened by summary statistics is to get some convexifying eect
of large numbers so that the usual convexity assumptions on action sets and payo
functions made in nite player games may be dropped. In the model as described
in 4.1, the set of players is partitioned into two measurable sets T and T^ , and while
action sets of the players in T are assumed to be convex, no such assumption is made
for the players in T^ . Thus a convexifying eect of large numbers is required for the
players in T^ . In regard to this, we will consider two scenarios which are described in
condition (S1) and (S2) below.
Recall that the set C^ in the denition of the externality map e is assumed to be
countable. Strengthening this assumption to require C^ to be nite gives the scenario
treated in Balder (2002).
(S1) The set C^ in the denition of e is nite.
Thus, under (S1), the restriction of the externality map e to T^ takes values in a nite-
dimensional vector space. Together with this, the non-atomicity hypothesis in (A5)
is sucient to give a convexifying eect needed to get a (pure strategy) equilibrium
without convexity assumptions on action sets or payo functions of the players in T^ .
This may be viewed as paralleling Liyapouno's theorem which says that the range of
an atomless vector measure with values in a nite-dimensional vector space is convex.
Now if C^ may be countably innite, so that the values of the restriction of the
externality map e to T^ may span an innite-dimensional vector space, then (A5) is
not sucient to guarantee the desired convexifying eect. In fact, with C^ allowed to
be countably innite, our model covers (as intended, see 4.1.3) games where action
sets are non-convex and uncountable and where the externality of a strategy prole
is its distribution. But for such games it is known that existence of a pure strategy
equilibrium may fail even when the space of players is assumed to be non-atomic (see
the examples in Khan et al. (1997)). This failure may be viewed as another manifesta-
tion of the fact that Liyapouno's theorem fails with innite-dimensional codomains
(Diestel & Uhl 1977, IX.1)see. On the other hand, as shown by the existence results
in Carmona & Podczeck (2009, Corollary 4) and Keisler & Sun (2009, Theorem 4.6),
the problem can be resolved if the hypothesis that the space of players be atomless is
strengthened to require this space to be super-atomless. In the context of the present
model, this suggests that in order to handle the case where C^ is countably innite,
(A5) has to be strengthened as follows.
(S2) The subspace measure on T^ dened from  is super-atomless.
(See Section 3 for the denition of super-atomless.) We remark that the existence
results in Carmona & Podczeck (2009, Corollary 4) and Keisler & Sun (2009, Theorem
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4.6) are established for games where players have a common action set and payo
functions are continuous. In view of this, our existence result with (S2) as stated in
Section 5 shows that a convexifying eect of the assumption that the measure space
of players be super-atomless becomes manifest in much more general settings.
4.3 Continuous security
The notion of continuous security was introduced in the case of nite-player games by
Barelli & Meneghel (2013) (see also Barelli & Soza (2009)), building on the notions of
multiply security, which was developed by McLennan et al. (2011), and that of better-
reply security, developed by Reny (1999). We rst present the denitions of better-
reply security and of continuous security for nite-player games and then extend this
latter notion to games with a continuum of players.
Consider a game G = hXi; uiii2I with nitely many players, where I is the set of
players, Xi is player i's action set, and ui :
Q
j2I Xj ! R player i's payo function.
Assume that, for each i 2 I, Xi is a nonempty, compact, and convex subset of a
Hausdor locally convex topological vector space and ui is bounded. The game G is
said to be better-reply secure if for each y 2Qi2I Xi which is not a Nash equilibrium of
G, and each  2 RI such that (y; ) is in the closure of the graph of the vector-valued
payo function u =
Q
i2I ui, there exists a player i 2 I, an action xi 2 Xi, a number
i > i and a neighborhood U i of y i in
Q
j2InfigXj such that ui(xi; y
0
 i)  i for
all y0 i 2 U i. Here y0i is the projection of y0 onto Xi, and y0 i that onto
Q
j2InfigXj.
It is plain that better-reply security holds whenever payo functions are continuous.
In fact, by Proposition 3.2 in Reny (1999), better-reply security provides a proper
generalization of both the usc and the lsc aspect of continuity.
The notion of better-reply security was extended by McLennan et al. (2011) to
the notion of multiply security, which in turn was extended by Barelli & Meneghel
(2013) to the notion of continuous security. Both extensions are based on a result
by McLennan et al. (2011, Lemma 2.5) which shows that better-reply security is
equivalent to the following condition: Whenever y 2Qi2I Xi is not a Nash equilibrium
of G, there is a neighborhood U of y in
Q
i2I Xi, a vector  2 RI , a number " > 0
and, for every i 2 I, an action xi 2 Xi such that:
(i) For every i 2 I, ui(xi; y0 i)  i + " for all y0 2 U .
(ii) For each y0 2 U there is an i 2 I such that ui(y0i; y0 i) < i   ".
Continuous security generalizes better-reply security as follows. First, rather than
requiring single actions (the xi's above) to secure payos on U , it is allowed that
payos can be secured along well-behaved correspondences dened on U ; this implies
that (i) may be satised with a larger , and hence that (ii) is easier to satisfy. Second,
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the number " is dropped, which another time makes both (i) and (ii) easier to satisfy.
On the other hand, following McLennan et al. (2011), the notion of continuous security
modies (ii) by adding a convexity assumption on payo functions, which however
is weaker than the assumption that payo functions be quasi-concave in the own
strategy, but strong enough so that no extra quasi-concavity assumption on payo
functions is needed anymore to get existence of Nash equilibrium (dierently from
Reny's (1999) main existence theorem, which, in addition to better reply security,
requires that payo functions be quasi-concave in the own strategy).
More precisely, the game G is called continuously secure if whenever y 2Qi2I Xi
is not a Nash equilibrium of G, there is a neighborhood U of y in
Q
i2I Xi, a vector
 2 RI and, for every i 2 I, a well-behaved correspondence 'i : U  Xi such that:
(a) For every i 2 I and every y0 2 U , 'i(y0) is convex or there is a nite-dimensional
subspace of Xi which contains 'i(y
0).
(b) For every i 2 I, ui(x; y0 i)  i for all y0 2 U and x 2 'i(y0).
(c) For each y0 2 U there is an i 2 I such that y0i =2 cofx 2 Xi : ui(x; y0 i)  ig.4
We remark that on the level of the primitives of a game, the dierence between
continuous security and better-reply security (or multiply security for that matter) is
not minor. In fact, as it can easily be inferred from Corollary 3 in Carmona (2011)
and Proposition 2.4 in Barelli & Meneghel (2013), if the payo functions ui in a nite-
player game as described above are quasi-concave in the own strategy and usc, and the
value functions y 7! supfui(x; y i) : x 2 Xig from
Q
j2I Xj to R are lsc, then the game
is continuously secure but need not be better-reply secure. Now upper semi-continuity
of payo functions and lower semi-continuity of value functions are the assumptions
made in Balder (2002) concerning continuity properties of payo functions. Thus, as
the model of our paper is based on (the pure strategy part of) that of Balder (2002),
it is natural to look for an adaption of the notion of continuous security to our model.
One aspect of such an adaptation concerns the sets U , i.e., the sets of strategy
proles at which each player needs to secure some payo against the actions of the
other players. In our setting of games as introduced in Section 4.1, the payo of a
player depends on the actions of the other players through the aggregates e(f) of the
4The denition of continuously secure in Barelli & Meneghel (2013) is not exactly equal to
the one presented here. Actually, Barelli & Meneghel (2013) do not require (a). Unfortunately, the
proof of Theorem 2.2 in Barelli & Meneghel (2013) does not go through without (a). The reason
is that the correspondence  in that proof is not necessarily closed-valued, because the convex hull
of a compact set need not be closed in an innite-dimensional space. To solve this problem, one
can, as we did here, require 'i(y
0) to be convex, as in Barelli & Soza (2009), or to be included in a
nite-dimensional subspace of Xi, as in McLennan et al. (2011).
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strategy proles f , and it is therefore natural to take subsets of the space EG of these
aggregates for the sets U .
Another need for adjustment arises because, unlike in the nite-player case, mea-
surability properties are not trivially satised when there is a continuum of players,
but have to be assumed explicitly. For a notion of continuous security in our setting,
this means that the following two specications are needed. First, the analogs of the
correspondences 'i must, as correspondences taking values in the universal action
space X, be linked together over the space of players in a measurable way, which
can be done using the notion of Caratheodory correspondence as stated in Section 3.
Second, the analog of the vector  must be required to be measurable as a function
on the space of players.
A nal point concerns condition (c) of the nite-player game denition of contin-
uous security, which invokes just one player at a given strategy prole. Instead we
need a formulation in terms of non-negligible sets of players, because an individual
player may be negligible in our setting.
Summarizing this discussion leads to the following denition, where EG is regarded
as being endowed with the topology introduced in Section 4.1, and CS abbreviates
continuous security.
Denition 1. A game G = ((T;; ); X; hXt; ut; Atit2T ; e) is said to satisfy CS if
whenever y 2 EG is such that there is no equilibrium strategy prole f with e(f) = y,
there is a neighborhood U of y in EG, a Caratheodory correspondence ' : TU  X,
and a measurable function  : T ! [ 1;+1] such that:
(a) For each y0 2 U , '(t; y0)  At(y0) for all t 2 T .
(b) For all y0 2 U and all t 2 T , '(t; y0) is convex or there is a nite-dimensional
subspace of X which contains '(t; y0).
(c) For each y0 2 U , ut(x; y0)  (t) for almost all t 2 T and all x 2 '(t; y0).
(d) If f is a strategy prole with e(f) 2 U , f(t) 2 At(e(f)) for almost all t 2 T^ , and
f(t) 2 coAt(e(f)) for almost all t 2 T , then there is a non-negligible set T 0  T
such that for every t 2 T 0 \ T^ , ut(f(t); e(f)) < (t), and for every t 2 T 0 \ T ,
f(t) =2 cofx 2 At(e(f)) : ut(x; e(f))  (t)g.5
The following remark may be useful in applications of CS.
Remark 8. (i) If for each t 2 T , ut(; y) is quasi-concave and At(y) is convex for all
y 2 EG, then (d) in this denition is equivalent to the simpler statement:
5Note that in (c) the exceptional set of measure zero may vary with y0, and that in (d) the set T 0
may vary with f . Also note that the set T 0 in (d) is not required to be measurable.
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(d') If f is a strategy prole with e(f) 2 U and f(t) 2 At(e(f)) for almost all t 2 T ,
there is a non-negligible set T 0  T such that ut(f(t); e(f)) < (t) for all t 2 T 0.
(ii) In the case where At(y) = Xt for all t 2 T and y 2 EG, (d) in the denition
reduces to the statement:
(d) If f is a strategy prole with e(f) 2 U , then there is a non-negligible set T 0  T
such that for all t 2 T 0 \ T^ , ut(f(t); e(f)) < (t), and for all t 2 T 0 \ T ,
f(t) =2 cofx 2 Xt : ut(x; e(f))  (t)g.
(iii) In particular, if for every t 2 T and y 2 EG, At(y) = Xt, and for every t 2 T , Xt
is convex and ut(; y) is quasi-concave for all y 2 EG, then (d) is equivalent to:
(d') If f is a strategy prole with e(f) 2 U , then there is a non-negligible set T 0  T
such that ut(f(t); e(f)) < (t) for all t 2 T 0.
Remark 9. As noted in Remark 7, a special case of the general model of Section 4.1
is that of nite-player games in normal-form (provided that the action spaces of the
players are included in a Souslin locally convex space). For this special case, it may
be seen that Denition 1 is exactly equivalent to the denition of continuous security
presented earlier for nite-player games, given that payo functions are real-valued
and bounded, so that the (t)'s in Denition 1 can be assumed to be real numbers.
Remark 10. We note that the framework of Balder (2002) has been extended in
Martins da Rocha & Topuzu (2008) by allowing players to have non-ordered pref-
erences. However, the notion of continuous security requires players to have payo
functions, and this is the reason why we adopted Balder's (2002) model. Recently,
two conditions were introduced to deal with discontinuous nite-player games when
players may have non-ordered preferences. These are condition B (and Bg) in Barelli
& Soza (2009) and the condition of point security in Reny (2013). We leave it for
future research whether our results extends to games in the framework of Martins da
Rocha & Topuzu (2008) by using some adaptation of these conditions.
5 The main existence results
In this section we state our two main results on existence of Nash equilibrium. They
correspond to the two scenarios specied in Section 4.2 by assumptions (S1) and (S2)
respectively.
Theorem 1. Let G = ((T;; ); X; hXt; ut; Atit2T ; e) be a game satisfying (A1)-(A6),
(S1), and CS. Then G has a Nash equilibrium.
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Theorem 1 is a special case of Theorem 3 below. We note that Theorem 1 general-
izes the pure strategy Nash equilibrium existence result of Balder (2002). Indeed, by
Theorem 4 in Section 6, Theorem 1 implies Balder's result. By the example in that
section, the converse fails.
Theorem 1 also implies the Nash equilibrium existence result for continuously
secure nite-player games by Barelli & Meneghel (2013), provided the action sets of
all players are included in a Souslin locally convex space (however, recall footnote 4).
Indeed, suppose for the space (T;; ) of players that T is nite and  is the counting
measure, and set T = T . Then, by what was pointed out in Remark 7, our setting of
games reduces to that of standard normal-form nite-player games. Besides of (A2),
the only assumptions of Theorem 1 that are not trivially satised in this reduced
setting are (A3)(i), (A4), and CS, and these are the assumptions in the result by
Barelli & Meneghel (2013) (concerning CS, see Remark 9).
Replacing (S1) in the statement of Theorem 1 by (S2) leads to the statement of
our second main result. Recall that (S2) strengthens (A5), so that (A5) is actually
not needed when (S2) is assumed.
Theorem 2. Let G = ((T;; ); X; hXt; ut; Atit2T ; e) be a game satisfying (A1)-(A4),
(A6), (S2), and CS. Then G has a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 2 is again a special case of Theorem 3 below. As may be seen in Section 7,
Theorem 2 implies a pure strategy Nash equilibrium result for games where the payo
of each player may depend on the entire distribution of the actions of the players
in T^ , rather than just on a nite-dimensional summary statistics of these actions as
in Theorem 1. In particular, Theorem 2 implies the existence results in Khan & Sun
(1999), Carmona & Podczeck (2009), and Keisler & Sun (2009) (see Remark 14 in
Section 7 below). In fact, Theorem 2 applies to situations where payos may depend
on the vector of the distributions of the actions played in each one of countably many
sub-populations of T^ . This will be explicitly shown in Section 7.
Note that assumptions (S1) and (S2), which are involved in Theorems 1 and 2, re-
spectively, are incomparable; neither of these assumptions implies the other. However,
the following condition unies (S1) and (S2).
(S3) The set C^ in the denition of the map e is nite or the subspace measure on T^
dened from  is super-atomless.
Of course, (S3) is not a generalization of (S1) and (S2) at a deeper level. It is an
auxiliary assumption, introduced just to state the following theorem, which obviously
contains both Theorem 1 and 2 as special cases.
Theorem 3. Let G = ((T;; ); X; hXt; ut; Atit2T ; e) be a game satisfying (A1)-(A6),
(S3), and CS. Then G has a Nash equilibrium.
(See Section 11.3 for the proof.)
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6 Connection to Balder (2002)
In the framework of Section 4.1, consider the following additional assumptions.
(A7) The map (t; x) 7! ut(x; y) from  G to [ 1;+1] is measurable for each y 2 EG.
(A8) (i) For each t 2 T , the correspondence At is well-behaved.
(ii) For each y 2 EG, the graph of the correspondence t 7! At(y) is measurable,
i.e., belongs 
 B(X).
(A9) For every t 2 T , ut is usc and wt is lsc.
(A10) For every t 2 T , the set fx 2 At(y) : ut(x; y) = wt(y)g is convex for all y 2 EG.
In the existence result about pure strategy Nash equilibria in Balder (2002), these
assumptions are made in addition to (A1)-(A6) and (S1). The following theorem
shows that our notion of continuous security covers this case.
Theorem 4. Let G = ((T;; ); X; hXt; ut; Atit2T ; e) be a game satisfying (A1)-(A6)
and (S1) or (S2). If (A7)-(A10) hold in addition, then G satises CS.
(See Section 11.4.1 for the proof.)
Note that (A9) is satised whenever all constraint correspondences are lower hemi-
continuous and all payo functions are continuous. Furthermore, if for each t 2 T ,
At takes convex values and ut(; y) is quasi-concave for all y 2 EG, then (A10) is
satised. Thus Theorem 4 shows that for games satisfying (A1)-(A8) and (S1) or
(S2), continuous security according to our notion holds whenever all constraint cor-
respondences and all payo functions are continuous, and for players belonging to T ,
the constraint correspondences take convex values and the payo functions are quasi-
concave in the own action. In particular, if T = T^ , and if there are no constraint
correspondences (in other words, if At(y) = Xt for all t 2 T and y 2 EG), then CS
holds, as it should be, whenever all payo functions are continuous.
It is well known that in nite-player games, continuous security does not imply
that payo functions are usc or that value functions are lsc (see, e.g., Carmona (2009)).
The same holds in the context of the present paper. In Section 2 we have presented
examples of games that satisfy CS and either fail to have usc payo functions or
fail to have lsc value functions. The example below is stronger by presenting a game
that satises CS and fails in both respects. In particular, the example shows that the
converse of the implication in Theorem 4 does not hold in general.
Example 2. A non-atomic game that satises CS where payo functions are not usc
and value functions are not lsc. Consider the game G constructed in Example 1, just
with A = fa1; a2; a3g in place of A = fa1; a2g, so that EG is now the unit simplex
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in R3, and with payo functions ut = u for all t 2 T , where u : A EG ! R is given
by setting, for all y 2 EG and some " > 0,
u(a1; y) =
(
y1 if y1 6= 1=2;
y1 + " if y1 = 1=2;
u(a2; y) =
(
1  y1 if y1 < 1=2;
1  y1   " if y1  1=2;
and
u(a3; y) =
(
1=2 if y1 6= 1=2;
1=2 + " if y1 = 1=2:
As in Example 1, (A1)-(A6) are satised. Clearly, (A7), (A8), and (S1) are also
satised, and so is (A10) as T = ;. Evidently u is not usc and the corresponding
value function is not lsc. Furthermore, the best-reply correspondence of the game is
not uhc. However, the game satises CS (see Section 11.4.4 for the proof).
The following denition places a weakening of the condition on payo functions
to be upper semi-continuous, introduced in Carmona (2009), in the context of our
model.
Denition 2. A game G = ((T;; ); X; hXt; ut; Atit2T ; e) is said to be weakly upper
semi-continuous (abbreviated weakly usc in the sequel) if the following holds for all
t 2 T : Whenever (xn; yn) ! (x; y) in Xt  EG and limut(xn; yn) 6= ut(x; y), there is
an x0 2 At(y) such that ut(x0; y) > limut(xn; yn).
Remark 11. As x0 6= x is not required in this denition, a game with usc payo
functions and well-behaved constraint correspondences is weakly usc. On the other
hand, it is easy to nd examples showing that the converse need not hold.
Theorem 5. Let G = ((T;; ); X; hXt; ut; Atit2T ; e) be a game satisfying (A1)-(A6)
and (S1) or (S2). If, in addition, G is weakly usc, wt is lsc for all t 2 T , and (A7),
(A8), and (A10) hold, then G satises CS.
(See Section 11.4.2 for the proof.)
7 A concretization of the general model
In this section we will present a specication of the model laid out in Section 4.1,
illustrating what is covered by the notion of externality map, and in particular aiming
to provide a bridge to potential applications.
In typical applications with a measure space of players, large atomic players appear
as singletons, and no convexity assumptions are made on the non-atomic part of the
space of players. In view of this, we replace (A6) by the following condition.
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(A11) The set T is countable, and for each t 2 T , ftg 2  with (ftg) > 0.
Note that by what was stated in Remark 6, (A9) implies that the set SG of restrictions
of strategy proles to T is equal to
Q
t2 T Xt and that if (A3)(i) holds in addition, then
the feeble topology on SG is the same as the topology of pointwise convergence, i.e.,
the product topology of
Q
t2 T Xt.
We are going to present a specication of the externality map so that, in an explicit
way, the entire distribution of the actions of the players in T^ may matter for the payo
of each player. However, in some contexts, such a specication is still too narrow. For
example, payos of players may depend on both the distribution of actions chosen by
men and that of the actions chosen by women. We will cover this kind of example by
allowing the payos of players to depend on the distributions of the actions played in
each one of countably many sub-populations of T^ .
One may also think of examples of the following kind. Suppose the players in T^ are
workers, which may be of dierent productivity. Now if the total output of workers is
relevant for payos, then it is not just the distribution of actions, eorts say, of the
players in T^ that matters for payos, but rather the joint distribution of actions and
productivity attributes of these players. To capture this sort of example, we consider
a space C of players' attributes (or characteristics) and a map c : T^ ! C assigning
attributes to the players in T^ . The following is supposed to hold.
(A12) (i) C is a completely regular Souslin space.
(ii) The map c : T^ ! C is measurable.
In most applications, C will be a Polish space. However, for sake of generality, and for
symmetry with assumption (A2) on the actions universe X, we just assume (A12)(i).
At a rst glance it may look odd to have the function c to be dened only on the
subset T^ of T . However, this is not a restriction. In fact, the externality of the game
will be dened in such a way that the payo of any player may depend on the entire
action prole of the players in T , and attributes of a player in T that are relevant for
payos of other players may be considered as incorporated already in the identity of
this player as point in T .
Summing up, we want to give a specication of the externality of a game so
that, in an explicit way, situations are described where each player's payo may
depend on the strategy prole of the players in T and on the vector of the joint
distributions of the actions and players' attributes appearing in each one of countably
many sub-populations of T^ . To this end, write M1+(X  C) for the set of all Borel
probability measures on X  C. Let J be a non-empty countable set and suppose
that for each j 2 J a non-negligible measurable subset Tj of T^ is given. Finally, let
~e : SG !
Q
t2 T Xt 
 
M1+(X  C)
J
be the map given by setting
~e(f) =
 
f j T ;


(1=(Tj))(jTj)  (f jTj ; cjTj) 1

j2J

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for every f 2 SG. Note that if (A12)(ii) holds, then the distributions involved in the
above expression are dened. The map ~e is now taken to be the externality map of
a game. Let ~EG denote the image of SG under ~e, i.e., ~EG = ~e(SG). Now the payo
function of player t is taken to be a function ut : Xt  ~EG ! [ 1;+1], thus being
of the form that was intended.
In the context of an externality map ~e as dened here, we summarize a game by
a list G = ((T;; ); X; hXt; ut; Atit2T ; ~e), on the understanding that the constraint
correspondences At are dened on ~EG, and the payo functions ut on the respective
sets Xt  ~EG. As may be seen from the proof of Theorem 6 below, the form of the
map ~e is just a concrete version of the form in which the externality map was dened
in Section 4.1.
As payo functions are now dened on the respective sets Xt ~EG, and constraint
correspondence on ~EG, we have to adjust the denition of continuous security stated
in Section 4.3, putting it into terms of ~e and ~EG. In particular, we have to choose a
topology on the set ~EG. With the following choice we will get a statement of continuous
security, in terms of ~e and ~EG, which will turn out to be topologically equivalent to
that in Section 4.3. Assuming that (A2) and (A12)(i) hold, we regard M1+(X  C)
as being endowed with the narrow topology, and the action sets Xt of the players
in T as being endowed with the subspace topology dened from the topology of X.
Now we give the set ~EG the subspace topology dened from the product topology ofQ
t2 T Xt 
 
M1+(X  C
J
.
We use the abbreviation CS' to dierentiate the following notion of continuous
security from the version called CS in Section 4.3.
Denition 3. A game G = ((T;; ); X; hXt; ut; Atit2T ; ~e) is said to satisfy CS' if
whenever y 2 ~EG is such that there is no equilibrium strategy prole f with ~e(f) = y,
there is a neighborhood U of y in ~EG, a Caratheodory correspondence ' : TU  X,
and a measurable function  : T ! [ 1;+1] such that:
(1) For each y0 2 U , '(t; y0)  At(y0) for all t 2 T .
(2) For all y0 2 U and all t 2 T , '(t; y0) is convex or there is a nite-dimensional
subspace of X which contains '(t; y0).
(3) For each y0 2 U , ut(x; y0)  (t) for almost all t 2 T and all x 2 '(t; y0).
(4) If f is a strategy prole with ~e(f) 2 U , f(t) 2 At(~e(f)) for almost all t 2 T^ , and
f(t) 2 coAt(~e(f)) for almost all t 2 T , then there is a non-negligible set T 0  T
such that for every t 2 T 0 \ T^ , ut(f(t); ~e(f)) < (t), and for every t 2 T 0 \ T ,
f(t) =2 cofx 2 At(~e(f)) : ut(x; ~e(f))  (t)g.
The next theorem will be proved as a consequence of Theorem 2. The proof will
show, in particular, that CS' can be reduced to CS.
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Theorem 6. Let G = ((T;; ); X; hXt; ut; Atit2T ; ~e) be a game satisfying (A1)-(A4),
(A11), (A12), (S2), and CS'. Then G has a Nash equilibrium.
(See Section 11.5 for the proof.)
Remark 12. The case where there is no attribute function can be regarded as a
special case of the framework of this section, by simply letting the attribute space C
be any singleton in this case. Thus Theorem 6, as well as Theorem 7 below, continues
to be true for a game where there is no attributes function c, and ~e is dened just in
terms of distributions of actions.
Remark 13. As said above, the way the externality map ~e has been dened is just a
concrete version of the form in which the externality map was dened in Section 4.1.
In fact, in the proof of Theorem 6 it is shown that, for some choice of an externality
map e as dened in Section 4.1, ~EG  ~e(SG) may be homeomorphically identied with
EG  e(SG). Thus Theorem 4 continues to hold with CS' in place of CS, with (A1)-
(A4), (A11), (A12), (S2), and with (A7)-(A10) formulated in terms of ~EG instead of
EG. In particular, by the discussion following the statement of Theorem 4, CS' holds in
games as specied in this section if T = T^ , if there are no constraint correspondences
(i.e., if At(y) = Xt for all t 2 T ) and no attribute function, if (A1)-(A3), (A7) and
(S2) hold (with (A7) holding for y 2 ~EG), and if all payo functions are continuous.
The next remark relates our results to those of Khan & Sun (1999), Carmona &
Podczeck (2009), and Keisler & Sun (2009).
Remark 14. In these papers, a game is given by a super-atomless complete prob-
ability space (T;; ) of players,6 a nite partition hTiii2I of T into non-negligible
measurable sets, a common compact metric action space K for all players, and a pay-
o function V (t) for each t 2 T , where V (t) is the value at t of a measurable function
V : T ! C(K M1+(K)I), denoting by M1+(K) the space of Borel probability mea-
sures on K, endowed with the narrow topology, and by C(K M1+(K)I) the space
of real-valued continuous functions on K  M1+(K)I , endowed with the sup-norm.
In terms of the present section, this yields a game G = ((T;; ); X; hXt; utit2T ; ~e)
specied as follows, so that Theorem 6 applies. For every t 2 T , let Xt = K. By
what was noted in Remark 3, K can be viewed as a subset of a Souslin locally convex
space X, so that (A2) holds for G. Concerning the externality, let T^ = T and dene
~e : SG ! M1+(X)I by setting ~e(f) =


(1=(Ti))(jTi)  (f jTi) 1

i2I for each f 2 SG.
Observe that for each i 2 I, (1=(Ti))(jTi) is an atomless probability measure on T ,
so for any y 2M1+(K) we have y = (1=(Ti))(jTi)  (f jTi) 1 for some f 2 SG. Hence,
6Recall that an atomless Loeb probability space is super-atomless, and that the notion of sat-
urated probability space in Keisler & Sun (2009) and that of super-atomless probability space are
equivalent.
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because hTiii2I is a partition of T , we have ~EG  ~e(SG) = M1+(K)I . Thus for each
t 2 T , we may set ut = V (t). Evidently (A1), (A3), and (S2) hold for G. The game
G satises CS'. Indeed, note rst that as the map t 7! ut : T ! C(K M1+(K)I) is
measurable, so is the map (t; x) 7! (ut; x) : T K ! C(K M1+(K)I)K, and that
the map (u; x) 7! u(x; y) : C(K M1+(K)I)  K ! R is continuous for each xed
y 2 ~EG. Thus for each y 2 ~EG, the map (t; x) 7! ut(x; y) : T K ! R is measurable,
being the composition of two measurable maps. Thus G satises (A7). Consequently,
by what was noted in Remark 13, G satises CS'. Finally, as the space (T;; ) of
players is super-atomless, (S2) holds for G. Thus, by Remark 12, Theorem 6 applies,
showing that G has an equilibrium. Thus Theorem 6 implies Theorem 1 in Khan &
Sun (1999), Corollary 4(4) in Carmona & Podczeck (2009), as well as the necessity
part of Theorem 4.6 in Keisler & Sun (2009). In fact, these latter results are implied
by Theorem 2, as Theorem 6 is a consequence of Theorem 2 (see Section 11.5).
8 Generalized payo secure games
In this section we take our model in the version as introduced in the previous section
and state a result providing sucient conditions for CS' to hold. The two conditions
in this result, presented in the following denitions, are versions of the notions of
generalized payo security and of better-reply closed game, introduced for nite-
player games by Barelli & Soza (2009) and Carmona (2011), respectively.7
Denition 4. A game G = ((T;; ); X; hXt; ut; Atit2T ; ~e) is said to satisfy GPS if
for all y 2 ~EG and " > 0 there is a neighborhood U of y in ~EG, a Caratheodory
correspondence ' : T  U  X, and a measurable function  : T ! R such that:
(a) For each y0 2 U , '(t; y0)  At(y0) for all t 2 T .
(b) For all y0 2 U and all t 2 T , '(t; y0) is convex or there is a nite-dimensional
subspace of X which contains '(t; y0).
(c) For each y0 2 U , ut(x; y0)  (t) for almost all t 2 T and all x 2 '(t; y0).
(d) There is a T"  T with (T") < " such that (t)  wt(y)  " for all t 2 T nT".
Denition 5. A game G = ((T;; ); X; hXt; ut; Atit2T ; ~e) is said to satisfy BRC if
the following holds for any strategy prole f : If there is a sequence hfni of strategy
7For nite-player games, our denition of generalized payo security is equivalent to the original
denition of that notion in Barelli & Soza (2009). Note also that for nite-player games, the property
of a game being better reply closed is equivalent to the property of weak reciprocal upper semi-
continuity at all non-equilibrium strategy proles; see Carmona (2011, Theorem 5), and see Bagh
& Jofre (2006) for the denition of weak reciprocal upper semi-continuity.
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proles with ~e(fn) ! ~e(f) such that, for almost all t 2 T , (a) fn(t) 2 At(~e(fn)) for
all n 2 N, (b) f(t) 2 LS fn(t), and (c) limn ut(fn(t); ~e(fn))  wt(~e(f)), then f is an
equilibrium of G.
Here LS fn(t) denotes the set of all cluster points of the sequence hfn(t)i. Note
that under (A11) and (A3)(i), e(fn) ! ~e(f) implies fn(t) ! f(t) for each t 2 T (see
the denition of ~e and the paragraph after the statement of (A11)), so that (b) in
Denition 5 reduces to a condition on the restrictions of strategy proles to T^ .
It is common in applications to assume for an atomic player that his action set is
convex, that his constraint correspondence takes convex values, and that his payo
function is quasi-concave in his action. Such convexity properties make the denition
of CS' easier as we have noted in Remark 8, and therefore we will assume them in
the following theorem. Convexity of the action sets of such players is already part of
(A4). Thus we introduce here:
(A13) For every t 2 T , At(y) is convex and ut(; y) is quasi-concave for all y 2 ~EG.
Theorem 7. Let G = ((T;; ); X; hXt; ut; Atit2T ; ~e) be a game satisfying (A1)-(A4),
(A11)-(A13), (S2), GPS and BRC. Then G also satises CS', and consequently, by
Theorem 6, G has a Nash equilibrium.
(See Section 11.6 for the proof.)
9 An Application: Optimal Income Taxation
We consider a version of the model of Mirrlees (1971) on optimal income taxation.
Specically, we develop a general framework to include several optimal taxation prob-
lems and address the existence of an optimal income tax in this framework. Our ex-
istence result for Nash equilibria will be used in the step establishing that the choice
set of the government as the agency that chooses the tax is non-empty. Due to im-
plementability constraints, non-emptiness of this set is a non-trivial issue in general;
see Example 7 below.
The economy consists of a continuum of individuals, described by a super-atomless
complete probability space (T^ ; ^; ^), and a government. There is a single consumption
good, which can be produced using labor. Each individual t 2 T^ is endowed with one
unit of time and is described by his skill level nt, which is the quantity of labor
provided by t per unit of time. We assume that there is an upper bound n > 0 on the
level of skills and an upper bound m  n on consumption. Writing M = [0; m] and
L = [0; 1], an individual t is further characterized by a continuous utility function
~ut : M L! R+, so that his utility is ~ut(m; l) when his individual consumption is m
and his eort level is l. Let N = [0; n] and let n^ : T^ ! N denote the function t 7! nt.
We make the following assumptions:
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(T1) The map t 7! ~ut from T^ to C(ML) is measurable, where C(ML) denotes the
space of real-valued continuous functions onML endowed with the sup-norm.
(T2) For every t 2 T^ , ~ut is strictly increasing in m, strictly decreasing in l, and
0  ~ut(m; l)  1 for all (m; l) 2M  L.
(T3) The map n^ is measurable.
(T4) The distribution ^  n^ 1 is atomless.
As in Golosov, Kocherlakota & Tsyvinski (2003), one unit of labor is transformed
into one unit of consumption. This assumption is made for simplicity since, normal-
izing the price of consumption to one, it implies that the equilibrium price of labor
is equal to one, too.8
The government chooses an income tax, which, as in Mirrlees (1971), is described
by a function  : [0; n] ! R+, with the interpretation that someone with income
z cannot consumer more that (z) after tax (note that [0; n] is the set of possible
incomes). As in Mirrlees (1971), income taxes are non-decreasing and right-continuous
(see Proposition 2 in Mirrlees (1971)). In addition, we assume that (n)  m.
The underlying assumption, here as well as in Mirrlees (1971), is that the govern-
ment can observe the income level of an individual but neither her skill nor her eort
level. Thus, we assume that the government observes neither the function n^ assigning
skills to individuals nor the eort level chosen by individuals. Specically, the gov-
ernment observes only the joint distribution of skills, utility functions, consumption
and eort levels.
Let  be the set of all non-decreasing right-continuous functions  : [0; n] ! R+
satisfying (n)  m. Dene a metric  on  by setting
(; 0) =
Z
[0;n]
j(z)  0(z)jdz + j(n)  0(n)j
for ; 0 2 , where the integral is with respect to Lebesgue measure on [0; n].9
(That  is indeed a metric, and not just a pseudo-metric, is true because two distinct
elements of  dier at n or, being non-deceasing and right-continuous, dier on some
non-empty open subset of [0; n).) In the sequel,  is always regarded as endowed with
this metric. By Lemma 5 in Section 11.7.1,  is then actually a compact metric space.
We will address the existence of an optimal income tax via a game played by the
government and the individuals. Modeling income taxes as above implies that the gov-
ernment's choice set in this game will be compact. This would not be the case would
8Without this assumption, we would need to add an auctioneer to the game used to show existence
of equilibrium.
9This form of a metric on  was suggested by a referee.
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one focus on income taxes that are continuous or on general incentive-feasible mech-
anisms (the latter being considered in Golosov et al. (2003)).10 However, allowing for
discontinuous income taxes implies that the individuals' and the government's payo
functions are discontinuous. Nevertheless, despite of such discontinuities, continuous
security will hold and will allow to prove existence of an optimal income tax.
To unify several optimal taxation problems, we consider the possibility that the
government in its choice of an income tax is restricted . To this end, let C^ be the
closure of the set f~ut : t 2 T^g in C(M L) and let C = C^N . Then C is a complete
separable metric space which contains the relevant attributes of the individuals. Let
M1+(C  M  L) be the set of Borel probability measures on C  M  L. Dene
c : T^ ! C by c(t) = (~ut; nt), t 2 T^ , and let K = f 2M1+(CM L) : C = ^  c 1g
be the set of distributions over attributes and actions. We regard K as being endowed
with the subspace topology dened from the narrow topology of M1+(C M  L).
Let : K   be a correspondence with the interpretation that, given  2 K, the
government may choose income taxes only from ().
Given  2 K, the distribution of the map (u; n;m; l) 7! nl from C M  L to
[0; n] is denoted by ^. Thus ^ is the distribution of outputs determined by , or, in
other words, the pre-tax income distribution given by . We write M1+([0; n]) for the
set of Borel probability measures on [0; n], and K^  M1+([0; n]) for the image of K
under the map  7! ^. As no confusion can arise, the symbol ^ will also be used
to denote generic elements of K^. We give K^ the subspace topology dened from the
narrow topology of M1+([0; n]), so that the map  7! ^ becomes continuous.
When looking for an optimal income tax, the government faces a constraint in
addition to that dened by the correspondence . As in Mirrlees's (1971), the gov-
ernment is constrained by an implementability condition: the allocation g that results
from the choice of a given income tax  must be such that (; g) is an equilibrium of
the economy. A precise denition of equilibrium is given below. Informally, an equilib-
rium is a feasible allocation g together with a tax function  such that all individuals
optimize and such that the government runs a balanced budget; however, specic
optimal tax problems may require additional properties to be met. Writing S(E) for
the set of equilibria of an economy E, the government's optimization problem is
max(;g)2S(E)
Z
T^
~ut(g(t))d^(t):
An income tax  is an optimal income tax if there exists a g : T^ !M L such that
(; g) is a solution of the government's optimization problem.
There is a commitment aspect implicit in the above denition of an optimal income
tax. In fact, it could happen that, while social welfare, i.e.,
R
T^
~ut(g(t))d^(t), is being
10Another reason for focusing on taxes instead of general incentive-feasible mechanisms has to do
with decentralization; see, for instance, Section 4.3 in Kocherlakota (2010).
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maximized from an ex-ante perspective, ex-post, after individuals have made eort
decisions, but before they actually carry out consumption, the government is able to
change the tax (in other words, to adjust the redistribution of aggregate output) so
as to increase social welfare even further. In Mirrlees (1971), such a case is ignored,
i.e., it is assumed that the government can commit to an ex-ante chosen tax system.
Below we will also consider an optimal tax problem where the government is able
to revise the tax after individuals have made eort decisions but before consumption
is carried out (see Example 7 below). In this case, an optimal income tax should have
the property that the government has no incentive to make use of this opportunity. We
will take care of this through the denition of equilibrium as follows. We introduce the
function v : K ! R, dened by setting v(; ) = R u((nl); l)d(u; n;m; l) for all
(; ) 2 K, and require that in an equilibrium (; g), where  is the tax function
and g = (m; l) the allocation,  is a solution of the problem max v(; ^(c; g) 1)
subject to the condition  2 (^ (c; g) 1) and to the balanced budget condition. As
v(; ^  (c; g) 1) = R
T^
~ut(g
(t))d^(t) by change of variables, this requirement implies
that in an equilibrium (; g) the government cannot increase social welfare by an
ex-post change of the tax function subject to the balanced budget condition and the
constraints set by .
For convenience of notation, we will require this condition also for an equilibrium
in the case where the government can commit to an ex-ante chosen tax function, but
in this case with the function v given by v(; ) = 0 for all (; ) 2 K, so that the
condition eectively reduces to the requirement  2 (^  (c; g) 1) and the balanced
budget condition. For sake of generality, in view of potential applications, we will
actually allow for an abstract function v : K ! R in our model.
We summarize an economy by a list E = h(T^ ; ^; ^);M; L;N; n^;;; v; h~ut; ntit2T^ i.
An equilibrium for an economy E is an income tax  together with a pair g =
(m; l), where m : T^ !M and l : T^ ! L are measurable functions, such that:
(a)  solves max v(; ^  (c; g) 1) subject to the conditions  2 (^  (c; g) 1) andR
T^
(ntl
(t))d^(t) =
R
T^
ntl
(t)d^(t).11
(b) For almost all t 2 T^ , g(t) solves max(m;l)2ML ~ut(m; l) subject to m  (ntl).
Conditions (a) and (b) together imply that g is a competitive equilibrium allocation.
Indeed, by the monotonicity assumption in (T2), we must have m(t) = (ntl(t))
for almost all t 2 T^ . Hence R
T^
m(t)d^(t) =
R
T^
(ntl(t))d^(t) =
R
T^
ntl
(t)d^(t) and
thus market clearing holds.
11Abusing notation, we sometimes write m to denote a function from T^ to M , instead a generic
element of M ; similarly for l and L. The meaning should be clear from the context.
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Note that for each individual t 2 T^ , ntl(t)   (ntl(t)) is just the dierence
between pre-tax income and after-tax income. Thus (a) requires, in particular, that
in an equilibrium the government runs a balanced budget.
The following ve examples clarify our framework and illustrate the exibility that
our framework allows. These examples also illustrate the assumptions we make on 
and v, which we now state.
(T5)  is well-behaved and takes convex values.
(T6) v is usc, v(; ) is quasi-concave for all  2 K, v(; ) is continuous for each
continuous  2 , and v(; )  0 for all (; ) 2 K.
(T7) For all  2 K and " > 0, there exists an open neighborhood O of  and a
continuous map  : O !  such that for all 0 2 O,
(i)  (0) 2 (0),
(ii)
R
 (0)(z)d^0(z) =
R
zd^0(z),
(iii) v( (0); 0) > v(; ) " for all  2 () such that R (z)d^(z) = R zd^(z).
Example 3. Suppose the government is unconstrained in its choice of an income tax
and can commit to an income tax it proposes, which is the case considered in Mirrlees
(1971). In the notation of our framework this means () =  and v(; ) = 0 for
all (; ) 2 K. It is clear that (T5) and (T6) are satised in this example. As for
(T7), simply let O = K and  (0) = 0 for all 0 2 O, where 0 is the identity, i.e.
0(z) = z for all z 2 N .
Example 4. Let () = f : (n   )  g for all  2 K, where  > 0 is a small
number, and 0 <  < n    a high number. This case can be interpreted as one
where the government commits to income taxes that give high work incentives for
highly skilled individuals. Alternatively, this case can be regarded as arising because,
if taxed at a high tax rate, high skill individuals will choose to evade taxation. Clearly
the subset f : (n   )  g of  is convex, and by Lemma 6 in Section 11.7, it is
closed. Thus (T5) holds. Let v(; ) = 0 for all (; ) 2 K. Then (T6) holds. As
in the previous example, letting O = K and  (0) = 0 for all 0 2 O shows that
(T7) holds, too.
Example 5. In this example we consider the case where the government ceases
to function as total output approaches zero. This is modeled by specifying  as
follows. First, only the 0% income tax 0 is allowed if total output is zero, with
the interpretation that in this case the government no longer exists and thus, in
particular, cannot redistribute income. Second, for total output larger than zero, the
income taxes the government can implement are those with a distance to the 0%
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income tax not exceeding a number which depends continuously on ^, i.e., on the
distribution of outputs.
Specically, let ^0 2 K^ be Dirac measure at 0 2 [0; n]. Set () = f0g if ^ = ^0,
and for some continuous function ^ 7! "(^) : K^ ! R, with "(^0) = 0 and "(^) > 0 for
^ 6= ^0, set () = C"(^)(0) for  2 K with ^ 6= ^0, writing C"(^)(0) for the closed
ball of radius "(^) around 0 for the metric  on . Further, let v(; ) = 0 for all
(; ) 2  K. As in the previous two examples, (T6) and (T7) hold. Clearly  is
well-behaved, as both the maps  7! ^ and ^ 7! "(^) are continuous. Also, C"(^)(0)
is convex for all  2 K, by the denition of . Thus (T5) holds.
We can now consider a fourth example, obtained by specifying  so as to capture
the basic idea of the credible income taxation problem in Farhi, Sleet, Werning &
Yeltekin (2011).
Example 6. As in Golosov et al. (2003), assume, in addition to (T1) and (T2), that
~ut(m; l) = (m) + (l) for all t 2 T^ and (m; l) 2 M  L, where  : M ! R and
 : L! R are functions with  strictly concave and (0) = (0) = 0. Let
() =
(
~() if 
 R
zd^(z)

+
R
(l)d(u; n;m; l) > 0;
 otherwise;
 2 K, where
~() =

0 2  :
Z
(0(z))d^(z) + 
Z
(l)d(u; n;m; l)  (1  )
Z
zd^(z)

:
Further, let v(; ) = 0 for all (; ) 2  K. Again, (T6) holds, and in Lemma 13
in Section 11.7.3 it is shown that the same is true for (T5) and (T7), and that in an
equilibrium (; g) of E the following must hold, writing g(t) = (m(t); l(t)):
(1)
Z
T^
 
((ntl(t))) + (l(t))

d^(t)
 (1  )


Z
T^
(ntl(t))d^(t)

+
Z
T^
(l(t))d^(t)

:
This condition is analogous to the credibility condition of Farhi et al. (2011) and
implies that the government credibly commits to  in the following sense. Suppose
that in each one of innitely many periods k 2 N, the government and the individuals
simultaneously choose an income tax k and consumption/eort pairs (mk(t); lk(t)),
respectively, knowing the entire history of previous taxes and joint distributions over
attributes and actions.12 In addition, assume that for each individual and the govern-
ment the utility in the repeated interaction is the discounted sum of the period-wise
12Note that we are restricting the government to choose income taxes that do not depend on the
tax paid previously by individuals, which is something that the government observes. This is an
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utilities, with discount factor  2 (0; 1), where the period-wise utility function of the
government is given by
R
T^
 
(k(ntlk(t))) + (lk(t))

d^(t) for all k 2 N, k being the
income tax and lk the eort allocation in period k.
13 In this setting, the above credi-
bility condition states that the stationary outcome with (; g) in every period is a
subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated game just described.14
At the core of the above example is the inability of the government to commit to
an income tax. In fact, the right-hand side of condition (1) describes the best short-
run deviation of the government, which, by the fact that individuals' choices are made
simultaneously, consists in choosing an income tax that gives all individuals the same
after-tax income.
In a nal example, we consider another non-commitment problem. Specically, it
is supposed now that, after individuals have made eort decisions, but before they
carry out consumption, the government may revise a tax announced earlier.
Example 7. Let  be as in Example 5, and set v(; ) =
R
u((nl); l)d(u; n;m; l)
for all (; ) 2   K. Then, as in Example 5, (T5) holds. If, in addition to what
is supposed in (T1) and (T2), ~ut(; l) is concave for all t 2 T^ and l 2 L, then by
Lemma 14 in Section 11.7.3, (T6) and (T7) hold, too. Now under the assumption
stated in the previous paragraph, an equilibrium implementing an optimal income
tax must have the property that the income tax maximizes aggregate utility subject
to the feasibility constraints set by  and the given total output. In view of (a) of
the equilibrium denition, this is guaranteed by specifying the government's auxil-
iary utility function v as above. (Recall in this regard that the specication of  in
Example 5 means, in particular, that the feasibility sets () of the government do
not depend on individuals' consumption, but only on the distribution of outputs.)
While in the previous examples an equilibrium can be easily constructed (there is an
equilibrium with a 0% income tax in Examples 3-5, and an equilibrium with a 100%
income tax in Examples 3 and 6), this is not the case in this example. In particular,
important restriction. In fact, if the outcome in the rst period is fully revealing (i.e. individuals
with dierent skills have dierent income levels) then the rst-best could be achieved from period 2
onwards. Alternative assumptions to rule out this case include: (1) the government is legally obliged
to tax only individuals' incomes, or (2) each individual lives only for one period and so pays taxes
only once. The latter assumption means that individuals are short-lived and the government is long-
lived; this poses no diculties within a repeated-game framework and is, in fact, standard (see, for
instance, Mailath & Samuelson (2006, Section 2.7) or Sabourian (1990)). We note that (2) is similar
to the overlapping generations assumption in Farhi et al. (2011).
13Note that
R
T^
((k(ntlk(t))) + (lk(t)))d^(t) =
R
NL((k(nl)) + (l))d^  (n^; lk) 1(n; l) for all
k 2 N, so all the government needs to know is the joint distribution of skills and eorts.
14Condition (1) is also necessary for a stationary outcome to be subgame perfect (see Chari &
Kehoe (1990)) since the payo of the government in the worst subgame perfect equilibrium from its
point of view is (0) + (0) = 0.
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there cannot be an equilibrium with a 0% income tax given the specication of v, and
there cannot be an equilibrium with a 100% income tax given the specication of .
Here is our theorem on existence of an optimal income tax.
Theorem 8. If the economy E = h(T^ ; ^; ^);M; L;N; n^;;; v; h~ut; ntit2T^ i satises
(T1)-(T7), then there exists an optimal income tax.
(See Section 11.7.2 for the proof.)
Remark 15. The problem of existence of an optimal income tax can be decomposed
into two parts: Existence of an equilibrium and existence of a solution to the gov-
ernment's optimization problem. While we establish the second part using standard
techniques, the rst part requires the use of our main existence result.
In many applications considered in the literature, as well as in some of those con-
sidered above, an equilibrium can be easily constructed. This is the case, for instance,
in the model of Mirrlees (1971), which was considered in Example 3. However, our
framework considerably generalizes that in Mirrlees (1971) to include, in particular,
the optimal tax model of Farhi et al. (2011) as well as new examples of economically
relevant optimal tax problems. Because of this generality, it is not a simple matter to
get an equilibrium in our framework. This is precisely illustrated in Example 7 above.
Remark 16. It is important to note that an optimal income tax in our general frame-
work cannot be interpreted as being in any sense superior to the income tax obtained
in Mirrlees (1971). This is so because the optimal taxation problem in Mirrlees (1971)
is the one which imposes the smallest set of restrictions on the government's choice.
Thus, the relevance of our framework and our result does not consist in obtaining
better optimal income taxes, but rather in obtaining the existence of optimal in-
come taxes in interesting optimal taxation problems, especially in problems where
equilibria of the economy cannot be found easily by construction (cf. Example 7).
To establish non-emptiness of the choice set of the government, i.e., of the equi-
librium set of the economy, we will use Theorem 7 to establish existence of a Nash
equilibrium in a game constructed as follows.
Let E = h(T^ ; ^; ^);M;L;N; n^;;; v; h~ut; ntit2T^ i be an economy satisfying (T1)-
(T7). The government will be denoted by player t, where t 62 T^ . Let T = ftg and set
T = T [ T^ ,  = ^ [ fB [ T : B 2 ^g and, for all B 2 , (B) = ^(B \ T^ ) + B(t),
where B is the characteristic function of B. Clearly Assumption (A11) holds, and
since (T^ ; ^; ^) is a super-atomless complete probability space by our specication of
an economy, so do (A1) and (S2).
Concerning players' action spaces, let Xt =  and Xt = M  L for all t 2 T^ . Let
X0 = L1([0; n+1]), the space of (almost everywhere equivalence classes of) Lebesgue
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integrable functions on [0; n + 1], endowed with the usual kk1-norm. Then X0 is a
separable Banach space; in particular, X0 is Souslin. Identify each  2  with the
element f 2 X0 given by setting f(z) = (z) for z 2 [0; n] and f(z) = (n) for
z 2 (n; n + 1]. Then (; 0) = kf   f0k1 for each , 0 2 , so  isometrically
embeds into X0. By Lemma 5 in Section 11.7.1, we may therefore regard  as a
compact subset of X0. Let X1 = R2, and let X be obtained from X0 and X1 in the
sense of Remark 3. We may then identify  and M  L with subsets of X, so that
(A2)-(A4) hold. Also, we may regard strategy proles as functions from T to X.
We take the space C = C^ N , which was dened above, for the attribute space
of the game, and the function c, which was dened by c(t) = (~ut; nt) for all t 2 T^ , for
the attribute function. By (T1) and (T3), (A12) is satised for C and c.
Now the externality map ~e and the externality space ~EG of the game have the
following form. Given f 2 SG (i.e., a measurable f : T ! X with f(t) 2  and
f(t) 2M L for almost all t 2 T^ ), we have ~e(f) = (f(t); ^  (c; f^) 1) where f^ = f jT^ .
Thus, with K as dened above, we have ~EG = K. In view of this, given y 2 ~EG,
we will often write (; ) for y.
Regarding players' payo functions, dene ut :  ~EG ! R by setting
ut(
0; ; ) =
(
v(0; ) if
R
(z   0(z)) d^(z) = 0;
 1 otherwise;
for all 0 2  and (; ) 2 ~EG. For t 2 T^ , dene ut : M  L  ~EG ! R by setting
ut(m; l; ; ) = ~ut(m; l) for all (m; l) 2M  L and (; ) 2 ~EG.
Finally, we specify the constraint correspondences. Dene At : ~EG   by setting
At(y) = () for all y = (; ) 2 ~EG. For t 2 T^ , dene At : ~EG  M  L by setting
At(y) = f(m; l) 2 M  L : m  (ntl)g for all y = (; ) 2 ~EG. Since the three sets
(), f0 2  : R (z   0(z)) d^(z) = 0g, and f0 2  : v(0; )  g,  2 R, are
convex, it follows that (A13) is satised.
Let G = ((T;; ); X; hXt; ut; Atit2T ; ~e) be the game just dened. It is clear that
every equilibrium of the economy E is a Nash equilibrium of G, and that by (T6) and
(T7), every Nash equilibrium of G is an equilibrium of E.
We note that the payo function ut in the game G need not be usc, so that the
existence result of Balder (2002, Theorem 2.2.1) cannot be applied to conclude the
existence of an equilibrium of G. E.g., suppose that ^  n^ 1 is uniform on [0; n],
() =  for all  2 K, and v(; ) = 0 for all (; ) 2   K. Dene 0 2  by
setting
0(z) =
(
z if z < n=2;
n if z  n=2:
Let f^ : T^ !ML and f^k : T^ !ML, k 2 Nnf0g, be given by f^(t) = f^k(t) = (nt; 1)
if nt < n=2, and by f^k(t) = (n=2   nt=k; n=(2nt)   1=k) and f^(t) = (n=2; n=(2nt))
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otherwise. Fix any  2 . Set yk = (; ^  (c; f^k) 1) and y = (; ^  (c; f^) 1). Then
(0; yk) ! (0; y). Also,
R
(0(nl)  nl) d^  (c; f^k) 1(u; n;m; l) = 0 for all k, andR
(0(nl)  nl) d^  (c; f^) 1(u; n;m; l) = n=4 > 0. Thus ut(0; yk) = 0 for all k, but
ut(
0; y) =  1, showing that ut is not usc. (In fact, ut is not even weakly usc and
player t's best-reply correspondence is not uhc.)
As announced, we will establish existence of a Nash equilibrium in the game G by
appeal to Theorem 7. To this end, we need to show that G satises GPS and BRC.
This step of the proof is isolated in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The game G satises GPS and BRC.
(The proof may be found in Section 11.7.1.) Now in view of this lemma and of what
was noted above, the game G satises all the assumptions of Theorem 7. Thus:
Theorem 9. The game G has an equilibrium.
10 Conclusion
We have established the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for (the pure-
strategy part) of Balder's (2002) model of large games, which has been extended as
follows. First, we have relaxed the continuity assumptions on players' payo functions
made in Balder (2002), adapting Barelli & Meneghel's (2013) notion of continuous
security to games with a measure space of players. Thus, in particular, we have ex-
tended the existence result of Barelli & Meneghel (2013) by dispensing the require-
ment that the set of players be nite. Second, under a strengthening of the notion of
non-atomicity, we have generalized the way the payo of each player depends on the
actions chosen by all players, covering, in particular, the case where players' payo
functions depend on the distribution of actions chosen by all players. Thus we have
generalized results in the line of Khan & Sun (1999) by allowing for discontinuous
payo functions. In short, our main existence results simultaneously generalize the
existence results of Barelli & Meneghel (2013) (by dispensing with nite set of play-
ers), Balder (2002) (by allowing discontinuous payo functions and by generalizing
the way players' payos depend on the actions chosen by all players), and Khan &
Sun (1999) (by allowing both for discontinuous payo functions and for action sets
that need not be common to all players and are just subsets of a Souslin space, rather
than of a Polish space).
Our main existence result has been applied to two classes of economic problems.
First, we have considered games with an non-atomic space of players, a nite action
space, and dispersed discontinuities. Non-atomic games with nite action spaces are
often found in applications with the additional assumption of continuous payo func-
tions, e.g. Karni & Levin (1994) and Roughgarden & Tardos (2004). Our result for
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this class of games can thus be used to cover a broader class of economic applications,
a point which we have illustrated with our simple congestion example in Section 2.
Second, we have presented a general framework for optimal taxation problems, which
includes the original model of Mirrlees (1971) (Example 3) and the more recent model
of Farhi et al. (2011) (Example 6). Several other examples illustrate the exibility of
our approach to address economically relevant optimal tax problems. Of these exam-
ples, Example 7 is noteworthy because it illustrates that other known approaches to
establish existence of equilibrium are inapplicable.
It is conceivable that our existence results have interesting applications in related
models. Especially relevant are the settings of Rath (1996), Kim & Yannelis (1997),
Milgrom &Weber (1985), and Balder (1988), as these are covered by the pure strategy
existence result of Balder (2002) which we have extended in this paper.
11 Appendix: Proofs
11.1 A general roadmap
In this appendix we present the proofs of our results. They are grouped according
to topic of the results into subsections. Section 11.3 is devoted to our main exis-
tence results (Theorems 1 and 2, unied by Theorem 3), Section 11.4 to the results
concerning the relationship between our existence results and the pure strategy exis-
tence result of Balder (2002) (Theorems 4 and 5 and Example 2), Sections 11.5 and
11.6 to the results for the concretization of our framework as described in Section 7
(Theorems 6 and 7 respectively), and Section 11.7 contains the proofs concerning our
optimal taxation application. Section 11.2 introduces some additional notation.
Let us note here also that completeness of a measure space is used below without
specic reference.
11.2 Additional notation
Let Z be a topological space. For a sequence hzni in Z, LS zn denotes the set of its
cluster points. For a sequence hAni of subsets of Z, KLSAn denotes the Kuratowski
limes superior, i.e., the set of those points z in Z such that for every neighborhood U
of z there are innitely many n with An \ U 6= ;.
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11.3 Proof of the main results
11.3.1 Basic idea and road map
The basic idea to prove our main existence results, Theorems 1 and 2, which are uni-
ed in Theorem 3, is to combine arguments as used in the existence proof of McLennan
et al. (2011) with Young measure techniques as used by Balder (2002), the link being
made by a purication argument. As in McLennan et al. (2011), we argue by con-
tradiction. We assume there is no Nash equilibrium and, via a xed-point argument,
obtain a strategy prole with properties contradicting CS. The diculty is to t this
argument to our context with a measure space of players. Several measurability issues
have to be taken care of. In particular, we cannot follow McLennan et al. (2011) in
applying the x point argument to a map operating on the product
Q
t2T Xt of the
action sets of the players. To get in the position for a xed point argument, we follow
Balder (2002) and place the analysis into a context of Young measures dened on T .
Roughly, Young measures on T are proles of mixed strategies. To link them to our
setting of pure strategies we need in particular a purication argument. For players in
T , this does not make a problem as actions set of these players are convex; as in Balder
(2002) we can purify by simply switching to the barycenter of a mixed strategy. For
players in T^ , the situation is more involved. In fact, in Theorem 2 the component of
the externality space referring to T^ may be innite-dimensional, so, for the matter of
that theorem, we cannot follow Balder (2002) by appealing to Liyapouno's theorem
for Young measures (cf. the discussion in 4.2). A purication result that applies to
innite-dimensional externality spaces may be found in Podczeck (2009). However,
this latter result needs a common action space for all players, so does not directly
apply to our setting, and therefore we need some extension.
Now the roadmap of the proof is as follows. In 11.3.2 we collect some basic facts
about Young measures, taken from Balder (1989) and Balder (2000). In 11.3.3 we
state and prove the purication result we need. In 11.3.4 we start by establishing the
link between Young measures on the one side and strategy proles and externalities
on the other. The link is specied by a map h whose properties are summarized in
Lemma 2. It is in the proof of that lemma where the purication result of 11.3.3
is applied. After that we present that part of our proof which is the analog in our
context of the existence proof in McLennan et al. (2011).
11.3.2 Young measures
We start by stating some denitions. Let us x a complete measure space (T;; )
with 0 < (T ) <1 and a completely regular Souslin space X. Write M1+(X) for the
set of all Borel probability measures on X.
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Recall that a Young measure from T to X is just a function g : T ! M1+(X)
which is measurable for the narrow topology of M1+(X). Recall that this property is
equivalent to the property that the map t 7! g(t)(B) is measurable for each B 2 B(X),
and also to the property that, for each bounded continuous p : X ! R, the map
t 7! R pdg(t) is measurable (cf. Balder (2002, p. 441)). The rst equivalence shows in
particular that if f : T ! X is a measurable map, then the map t 7! f(t) is a Young
measure, where f(t) denotes Dirac measure at f(t).
LetR denote the set of all Young measures from T to X, endowed with the narrow
topology for Young measures. Recall that this topology is dened to be the coarsest
topology on R such that for each q 2 G the functional
g 7!
Z
T
Z
X
q(t; x)dg(t)d(t) : R! R
is continuous, where G is the set of all measurable functions q : T X ! R such that
q(t; ) is continuous for each t 2 T and such that, for some integrable q : T ! R+,
supfjq(x)j : x 2 Xg  q(t) for each t 2 T . It should be noted that, in general, the
narrow topology for Young measures is not a Hausdor topology.
In the sequel, if  : T  X is a correspondence, then R denotes the subset of R
dened by setting
R = fg 2 R : supp g(t)  (t) for almost all t 2 Tg:
The fact presented in the following theorem is fundamental for the xed point argu-
ment in the proof of our equilibrium existence result. The compactness part in this
theorem is a deep result due to Balder (1989).
Theorem 10. Let  : T  X be a correspondence with measurable graph such that
(t) is non-empty and compact for all t 2 T . Then the subset R of R is non-empty,
closed, compact, and sequentially compact.
Proof. As noted above, if f : T ! X is measurable, then the map t 7! Dirac measure
at f(t) belongs to R. Thus non-emptiness of R is implied by the von Neumann-
Aumann-Sainte Beuve measurable selection theorem (see Castaing & Valadier (1977,
Theorem III.22)). From Balder (1989, Theorem 2.2 and Remark 2.4) it follows that
R is both relatively compact and relatively sequentially compact. Hence, given that
R is closed, it is both compact and sequentially compact. That R is indeed closed
may be seen as follows. Recall that a Souslin space is separable and that on any such
space, if it is completely regular, there is metric that gives a topology weaker than the
original one but such that the Borel sets for both topologies are the same.15 Choose
15Recall that a Souslin space X is Hausdor by denition, and therefore, if it is completely regular,
the set of (bounded) continuous functions on X separates the points of X. But on a Souslin space X,
37
such a metric, say , on the space X under consideration. In particular, X is separable
for . Dene q : T X ! R by setting
q(t; x) = minf1; (x; (t))g; (t; x) 2 T X:
Using Castaing & Valadier (1977, Theorems III.22, III.9, and Lemma III.14) it may
be seen that q belongs to the set G dened above. Now as  takes closed values, an
element g 2 R belongs to R if and only if
R
T
R
X
q(t; x)dg(t)d(t) = 0. Thus, by the
denition of the narrow topology for Young measures, R is closed in R.
The next statement is just a translation of Theorem 4.15 in Balder (2000) into
our notation.
Theorem 11. If gn ! g in R, then supp g(t)  KLS supp gn(t) for almost all t 2 T .
11.3.3 The purication result
The purication result we need will be proved as a consequence of the purication
result in Podczeck (2009). As in the previous section, (T;; ) is a complete measure
space with 0 < (T ) <1, and X a completely regular Souslin space.
Theorem 12. Let  : T  X be as in Theorem 10. Writing   for the graph of , let C
be a countable set of functions q :   ! R such that (i) q is measurable for the subspace
-algebra of   dened from 
B(X), (ii) q(t; ) is continuous on (t) for each t 2 T ,
(iii) there is an integrable q : T ! R+ such that supfjq(t; x)j : x 2 (t)g  q(t) for
almost all t 2 T . Suppose (T;; ) is super-atomless. Then given any g 2 R, there
is a measurable f : T ! X such that
(1) f(t) 2 supp g(t) for almost all t 2 T ;
(2)
R
T
R
X
q(t; x)dg(t)(x)d(t) =
R
T
q(t; f(t))d(t) for all q 2 C;
(3)
R
T
g(t)(B)d(t) = (f 1(B)) for all B 2 B(X).
Proof. By Podczeck (2009), the theorem is true in the special case where X is a
compact metric space and the maps q are dened on all of T  X, and where (i)
assumed to hold with T X in place of  , and (ii) and (iii) with X in place of (t).
We will show that the situation of the present theorem can be reduced to this case.
As in the proof of Theorem 10, recall that a Souslin space is separable and that
on any such space there is metric that gives a topology weaker than the original one
but such that the Borel sets for both topologies are the same.
any set of continuous functions that separates the points of X contains a countable subset with the
same property (Castaing & Valadier (1977, III.31)). This yields the assertion concerning the metric.
Now the assertion concerning the Borel sets follows from Schwartz (1973, p. 101 Corollary 2).
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This fact implies that we may view X as a subset of a compact metric space K
such that the inclusion map i : X ! K is continuous and such that B(X) coincides
with the subspace -algebra dened from B(K) (use Engelking (1989, Theorem 3.5.2),
which is a compactication result, and for the assertion on the Borel -algebras, use
Castaing & Valadier (1977, Lemma III.20) in addition). In particular, for each t 2 T ,
since (t) is a compact subset of X, (t) is also compact as a subset of K, and the
topologies of X and K give the same subspace topology on (t). Furthermore, a map
f : T ! X is measurable for B(X) if and only if it is measurable for B(K) when
viewed as a map into K.
Fix any g 2 R. As the inclusion i : X ! K is continuous, we may dene a map
g1 : T ! M1+(K) by setting g1(t) = g(t)  i 1 for each t 2 T (i.e., g1(t) is the image
measure of g(t) under i). In particular, for any continuous map p : K ! R, we haveR
K
pdg1(t) =
R
X
p  idg(t) for every t 2 T , and therefore the map t 7! R
K
pdg1(t) is
measurable, by the fact that g is a Young measure. Moreover, because supp g(t)  (t)
for almost t 2 T by denition of R, we must have supp g1(t) = supp g(t) for almost
all t 2 T , by what was noted in the previous paragraph about the sets (t).
We assert the following.
Claim: For each q 2 C there is a q0 : T  K ! R such that (a) q0j  = q, (b) q0 is
measurable, (c) q0(t; ) is continuous for each t 2 T , (d) supfjq0(t; x)j : x 2 Kg  q(t)
for almost all t 2 T .
Assuming the claim has been established, the theorem can be proved as follows. By
Podczeck (2009, Corollary and Lemma 2), the fact that t 7! R
K
pdg1(t) is measurable
for each continuous p : K ! R implies that there is a measurable f : T ! K such
that (1)-(3) of the theorem hold with g1 substituted for g, B(K) for B(X), and with
each q 2 C replaced by an element q0 associated with q according to the claim. Now
since supp g1(t) = supp g(t) for almost all t 2 T , (1) of the theorem must also hold
with f and g, i.e., f(t) 2 supp g(t) for almost all t 2 T , and therefore, in view of (a) of
the claim, (2) must actually hold with f , g, and the given C, because supp g(t)  (t)
for almost all t 2 T , and because g1(t) = g(t)  i 1 for each t 2 T . Note that since
f(t) 2 (t) for almost all t 2 T , we have f(t) 2 X for almost all t 2 T . Changing
f on a null set of T , if necessary, we may assume that f takes all of its values in X.
Now, because for every B 2 B(X) there is a B0 2 B(K) with B = B0 \X = i 1(B0),
f must be measurable for B(X), and the fact that (3) of the theorem holds with f ,
g1, and B(K) implies that (3) of the theorem holds with f , g, and B(X) as well.
Thus it remains to establish the above claim. Take any q 2 C and note rst that
continuity of q(t; ) on (t) as subspace ofX, which holds for each t 2 T by hypothesis,
implies continuity on (t) as a subspace of K, by what was noted above. Dene
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q1 :   ! R by setting
q1(t; x) = 3=2 + (1=2) arctan q(t; x); (t; x) 2  :
Then q1 is measurable for the subspace -algebra on   dened from  
 B(X),
because q is. Also, q1(t; ) is continuous on (t) for each t 2 T , and q1 takes all of its
values in (1; 2).
Let  denote the metric of K. As (t) is compact and therefore closed in K for
each t 2 T , and as q1 takes values in (1; 2), we can dene a function q2 : T K ! R,
also taking values in (1; 2), by setting q2(t; x) = q1(t; x) if x 2 (t) and
q2(t; x) = inf

q1(t; u)(x; u)
(x; (t))
: u 2 (t)

otherwise. Note that for each t 2 T , q2(t; ) is a continuous extension of q1(t; ) to K
(see, e.g., Mandelkern (1990)). We claim that q2 is measurable. As q2(t; ) is continuous
for each t 2 T , to establish this claim it suces by Castaing & Valadier (1977, Lemma
III.14) to show that q(; x) is measurable for each x 2 K.
To this end, we appeal to Castaing & Valadier (1977, Theorem III.22) to choose a
countable set fhi : i 2 Ig of measurable functions hi : T ! X such that fhi(t) : i 2 Ig
is a dense subset of (t) for each t 2 T . By the measurability property of q1 mentioned
before, measurability of the hi's implies in particular that the maps t 7! q1(t; hi(t))
are measurable. By what was said in the third paragraph of this proof, each hi is
measurable also when viewed as map into K, and for each t 2 T , fhi(t) : i 2 Ig is
dense in (t) also for the topology of K. Taking some x 2 K now as given, it follows
that for each i 2 I the map t 7! (x; hi(t)) is measurable, and therefore the map
t 7! (x; (t)) must be measurable as well. Thus if we set T1 = ft 2 T : (x; (t)) > 0g
and dene ei : T ! R, i 2 I, by setting
ei(t) =
8><>:
q1(t; hi(t))(x; hi(t))
(x; (t))
if t 2 T1;
q1(t; x) if t 2 T n T1;
then ei is measurable (recall that the sets (t) are closed in K, so ei is indeed dened
on T nT1). Now because fhi(t) : i 2 Ig is dense in (t), and because the function
u 7! q1(t; u)(x; u)=(x; (t)) is continuous on (t) for each t 2 T1, we must have
q2(t; x) = inffei(t) : i 2 Ig for each t 2 T . As I is countable, it follows that q2(; x) is
measurable.
Recalling that q2 takes values in (1; 2), dene q3 : T K ! R by setting
q3(t; x) = tan(2q2(t; x)  3); (t; x) 2 T K:
Then, because q2 is measurable, so is q3, and as q2(t; ) is continuous for each t 2 T ,
so is q3(t; ) for each t 2 T . Thus (b) and (c) of the claim above hold for q3. By
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construction, for each t 2 T we have q3(t; x) = q(t; x) if x 2 (t), i.e., (c) of the claim
holds for q3. As for (d), consider any t 2 T , and note that the choice of q2(t; ) implies
that for any x 2 Kn(t),
inffq1(t; y) : y 2 (t)g  q2(t; x)  supfq1(t; y) : y 2 (t)g;
and therefore, by choice of q3(t; ), since q3(t; x) = q(t; x) for all y 2 (t),
inffq(t; y) : y 2 (t)g  q3(t; x)  supfq(t; y) : y 2 (t)g;
from which it follows that supfjq3(t; x)j : x 2 Kg = supfjq(t; x)j : x 2 (t)g  q(t).
Thus (d) of the claim holds for q3. This completes the proof.
11.3.4 Proof of Theorem 3
Let us x a game G = ((T;; ); X; hXt; ut; Atit2T ; e) such that (A1)-(A6) and (S3)
hold. Thus X is now a locally convex space in addition to being Souslin.
As before, R denotes the set of all Young measures from T to X, endowed with
the narrow topology for Young measures. By RG we denote the subset of R dened as
RG = fg 2 R : supp g(t)  Xt for almost all t 2 Tg:
Now by Balder (2002, Corollary 4.2.1), (A3)(i) and (A4) together imply that there
is a map h1 : RG ! SG such that for each g 2 RG, h1(g)(t) is the barycenter of g(t)
for almost all t 2 T , i.e., the unique element x 2 Xt for which p(x) =
R
Xt
pdg(t)
for every continuous linear functional p on X. Dene h2 : RG ! RC^ by setting
h2(g) =

R
T^
R
Xt
q(t; x)dg(t)(x)d(t)

q2C^ for each g 2 RG, where C^ is the countable
set involved in the externality map e. Finally dene h : RG ! SG  RC^ by setting
h(g) = (h1(g); h2(g)) for g 2 RG.
Recall from Section 4.1 that RC^ is endowed with the product topology, SG with
the feeble topology, SG  RC^ with the corresponding product topology, and the set
EG  e(SG)  SG  RC^ with the subspace topology.
Lemma 2. The following hold for the map h.
(a) h is a surjection onto EG.
(b) h is continuous as map from RG to EG
(c) Given any g 2 RG, there is an f 2 SG, with e(f) = h(g), such that for almost all
t 2 T^ , f(t) 2 supp g(t), and for almost all t 2 T , f(t) 2 co supp g(t).
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Proof. We rst show that (c) holds. Consider any g 2 RG. If the set C^ is nite, then
by Lyapunov's theorem for Young measures (see Balder (2002, Theorem, 4.2.3)),
assumption (A5) implies that there is a measurable function f^ : T^ ! X such that
h2(g) =

R
T^
q(t; f^(t))d(t)

q2C^ and such that f^(t) 2 supp g(t) for almost all t 2 T^ .
If C^ is countably innite, then by (S3), the subspace measure on T^ dened from  is
super-atomless, and we get an f^ : T^ ! X with the same properties by Theorem 12
(with T there replaced by T^ , and C by C^), noting that by (A3), Xt is compact for
each t 2 T^ and the graph of the correspondence t 7! Xt : T^ ! X is measurable.
Dene f : T ! X by setting f(t) = h1(g)(t) for t 2 T , and f(t) = f^(t) for t 2 T^ .
Thus f j T = h1(g) 2 SG. In particular, f j T is measurable and we have (f j T )(t) 2 Xt for
almost all t 2 T . As g 2 RG means supp g(t)  Xt for almost all t 2 T , the fact that
f^(t) 2 supp g(t) for almost all t 2 T^ implies that we have f(t) 2 Xt also for almost
all t 2 T^ . Thus f(t) 2 Xt for almost all t 2 T , and because T and T^ are measurable
subsets of T , it follows that f is measurable. That is, f 2 SG. In particular, e(f) is
dened. Recalling that the denition of e says e(f) = (f j T ;

R
T^
q(t; f^(t))d(t)

q2C^),
we may conclude that e(f) = (h1(g); h2(g)) = h(g). Now by construction, we have
f(t) 2 supp g(t) for almost all t 2 T^ . Also, because f(t) = h1(g)(t) for t 2 T , and
because by the denition of h1, h1(g)(t) is the barycenter of g(t) for almost all t 2 T ,
we must have f(t) 2 co supp g(t) for almost all t 2 T , by the denition of barycenter
and by the separation theorem. Thus (c) holds.
Now as EG = e(SG) by denition, (c) implies that h takes values in EG. Evidently
the denition of h implies that if f is any element of SG, and g 2 RG is dened
by g(t) = f(t), where f(t) is Dirac measure at f(t), then h(g) = e(f), so h is a
surjection onto EG, again because EG = e(SG). This (a) holds. As for (b), by Balder
(2002, Theorem 4.2.2) it follows that the map h1 continuous, and by the argument in
Step 1 in the proof of Theorem 2.2.1 in Balder (2002), it follows that for each q 2 C^
the map g 7! R
T^
R
Xt
q(t; x)dg(t)d(t) : RG ! R is continuous. Thus, by choice of the
topologies of SG  RC^ and EG, (b) follows.
The following fact is also used outside the proof of Theorem 3 and for this reason
singled out as a lemma.
Lemma 3. The set EG is compact and pseudo-metrizable.
Proof. Theorem 10 and Lemma 10(a), (b) show that EG is compact. Assumption (A6)
implies that SG is pseudo-metrizable (see Balder (2002, Remark 4.3.1)), and because
C^ is countable, RC^ is metrizable. Thus EG  SG  RC^ is pseudo-metrizable.
We are now ready for the proof of Theorem 3. Suppose by way of contradiction
that the game G has no equilibrium. Then by CS and compactness of EG, there is a
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nite family hUj; 'j; jij2J where hUjij2J is a covering of EG by open subsets, and
'j, j correspond to Uj according to CS for each j 2 J .
Let  denote a pseudo-metric for Eg and recall that Lebesgue's covering theorem
holds in compact pseudo-metric spaces. We can therefore nd an " > 0 so that each
closed -ball in EG of radius 2" is included in some member of the open covering
hUjij2J of EG. Let hBiii2I be a nite covering of EG by closed -balls of radius
". Then the choice of " implies that whenever hBiii2I0 is subfamily of hBiii2I withT
i2I0 Bi 6= ;, there is a j 2 J such that
S
i2I0 Bi  Uj.
Fix any i 2 I. Dene a Caratheodory correspondence 'i : T Bi  X as follows.
Let H = fj 2 J : Bi  Ujg. By the previous paragraph, H is non-empty. Using the
fact that the functions j are measurable, we can nd a nite partition hTkik2K of T
into measurable sets and a corresponding family hjkik2K of elements of H such that
if t 2 Tk then jk(t)  j(t) for each j 2 H. Now dene 'i : T  Bi  X by setting
'i(t; y) = 'jk(t; y) for (t; y) 2 Tk  Bi, k 2 K. It is clear that 'i(t; ) is well-behaved
for each t 2 T . Furthermore, for every y 2 Bi, we have
graph('i(; y)) =
[
k2K
(graph('jk(; y)) \ (Tk X)) ;
showing that the graph of 'i(; y) is measurable, because K is nite. Thus 'i is a
Caratheodory correspondence. By (a) in the denition of CS, 'i(t; y)  At(y) for
each (t; y) 2 T  Bi. Also, given any y 2 Bi, (c) in the denition of CS implies that,
for almost all t 2 T , if x 2 'i(t; y) then ut(x; y)  j(t) for each j with Bi  Uj.
Do this construction for each i 2 I. For each y 2 EG, set Iy = fi 2 I : y 2 Big.
Let ' : T  EG  X be the correspondence dened by setting
'(t; y) =
[
i2Iy
'i(t; y); (t; y) 2 T  EG:
Then, because each 'i is a Caratheodory correspondence, so is '. (Indeed, rst it is
clear that ' takes non-empty values, and as I is nite, ' takes closed values. To see
that '(t; ) is uhc for each t 2 T , x t 2 T and y 2 EG, and consider an open O  X
such that '(t; y)  Si2Iy 'i(t; y)  O. As each 'i(t; ) is uhc and Iy is nite, there is
a neighborhood V of y in EG such that
S
i2Iy '
i(t; y0)  O for each y0 2 V . As InIy is
nite and all the Bi's are closed, setting V
0 = Vn(Si2InIy Bi), V 0 is still a neighborhood
of y, but such that Iy
0  Iy for all y0 2 V 0, implying that '(t; y0)  O for all y0 2 V 0.
Finally, for any y 2 EG, it is clear that since each 'i(; y) has a measurable graph, so
does '(; y), again since I is nite, and since the graph of '(; y) is the union over Iy
of the graphs of the correspondences 'i(; y).)
We claim that there are a y 2 EG and a measurable f  : T ! X such that
y = e(f ) and for almost all t 2 T , f (t) 2 '(t; y) if t 2 T^ , and f (t) 2 co'(t; y)
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if t 2 T . Assuming for the time being that this has been established, let us see how
to nish the proof.
Note rst that by denition of ', we have f (t) 2 Si2Iy 'i(t; y) for almost all
t 2 T^ , and f (t) 2 coSi2Iy 'i(t; y) for almost all t 2 T . By (b) in CS, if t 2 T then
'i(t; y) is convex or included in a nite-dimensional subspace of X, in addition to
being compact, so we actually have f (t) 2 coSi2Iy 'i(t; y) for almost all t 2 T (by
the general fact that the convex hull of the union of nitely many such subsets of a
Hausdor topological vector space is closed; e.g., combine Lemma 5.29 and Corollary
5.33 in Aliprantis & Border (2006)). Now by denition of the sets Iy, applied to Iy

,
we have y 2 Ti2Iy Bi. According to what was noted in the last sentence of the
third paragraph of this proof, this means there is a j 2 J such that Bi  Uj for all
i 2 Iy . But from the fourth paragraph, if y 2 Bi  Uj then, for almost all t 2 T ,
x 2 'i(t; y) implies ut(x; y)  j(t). As x 2 'i(t; y) also implies x 2 At(y),
we may conclude that f (t) 2 fx 2 At(y) : ut(x; y)  j(t)g for almost all t 2 T^ ,
and that f (t) 2 cofx 2 At(y) : ut(x; y)  j(t)g for almost all t 2 T . However,
by (d) in the denition of CS, this is impossible because e(f ) = y 2 Uj , and this
contradiction establishes the theorem.
Thus it remains to be shown that the above claim is correct. To this end, consider
the correspondence '1 : EG  RG dened by setting
'1(y) = fg 2 RG : supp g(t)  '(t; y) for almost all t 2 Tg; y 2 EG:
Then by Theorem 10, the fact that ' is a Caratheodory correspondence implies that
'1 takes non-empty closed values. The fact that ' is a Caratheodory correspondence
means, in particular, that '(t; ) is well-behaved for each t 2 T , which implies that
if y 2 EG is a limit of a sequence hyni in EG, then KLS'(t; yn)  '(t; y) for each
t 2 T (because the codomain Xt of '(t; ) is compact Hausdor, therefore regular).
Consequently, by Theorem 11, '1 has a sequentially closed graph in EGRG. As EG
is pseudo-metrizable by Lemma 3, and RG is sequentially compact by Theorem 10,
it follows that '1 is uhc as may readily be seen.
Let '2 : RG  RG be the composition '2 = '1  h, where h is the map from
Lemma 2. Then '2 is uhc, because '1 is and because by Lemma 2, h is continuous.
Also, '2 takes non-empty closed values. These properties of '2 guarantee that '2 has
a xed point, g say (see the discussion in steps 2 and 6 in the proof of Theorem 4.1.2
in Balder (2002)). Choose an element f  2 SG which corresponds to g according to
Lemma 2(c), and set y = e(f ). Then g 2 '1(y), and by the denition of '1 it
follows that f  and y are as required in the claim above. This completes the proof.
44
11.4 Proofs related to Sections 2 and 6
11.4.1 Proof of Theorem 4
Fix a game G = ((T;; ); X; hXt; ut; Atit2T ; e) satisfying assumptions (A1)-(A10)
and (S1) or (S2).
The idea of the proof is to adapt the following argument. Consider a nite player
game (Xi; ui)i2I as described in Section 4.3, and assume that value functions are lsc,
and payo functions usc and quasi-concave in the own action, so that, in particular,
best reply correspondences are well-behaved and take convex values. Now if y 2Q
j2I Xj is not an equilibrium strategy prole in this game, then for some " > 0, some
player i (a) can ensure a payo at least ui(y) + " along his best reply correspondence
on some neighborhood U1 of y i in
Q
j 6=iXj, by lower semi-continuity of his value
function, but (b) gets a playo smaller than ui(y) + " on some neighborhood U2 of y
in
Q
j2I Xj, by upper semi-continuity of his payo function. It follows at once from
this that the game is continuously secure, with the 'i's taken to be certain restrictions
of the best-reply correspondences.
The main diculty with carrying out this kind of argument in the context of the
proof to be given here concerns the analog of (b). The problem is that CS is dened in
terms of neighborhoods of points in the externality space EG and these neighborhoods
do not put any restrictions on the actions of any player belonging to the non-atomic
part of T . The crucial step to deal with the problem is separated in the following
lemma, because the fact established is also needed in other contexts later on.
Lemma 4. Let hfni be a sequence in SG with e(fn)! y for some y 2 EG. Then there
is an f 2 SG such that e(f) = y and such that for almost all t 2 T^ , f(t) 2 LS fn(t),
and for almost all t 2 T , f(t) 2 co LS fn(t).
Proof. Let RG and h be as in Section 11.3.4, and for each n dene gn 2 RG by setting
gn(t) = fn(t) for t 2 T , where fn(t) denotes Dirac measure at fn(t). By Theorem 10
there are a g 2 RG and a subsequence hgki of the sequence hgni such that gk ! g inR.
By Theorem 11, we have supp g(t)  KLS supp gk(t)  KLS supp gn(t) for almost all
t 2 T , and by Lemma 2(b), h(gk)! h(g). Choose f 2 SG such that f corresponds to
g according to Lemma 2(c), and let hfki be the subsequence of hfni corresponding to
hgki. Observing that h(gn) = e(fn) for each n, and that KLS supp gn(t) = LS fn(t) for
each t 2 T by denition of the gn's, we may see that f and hfki are as required.
Let ' : T  EG  X denote the best reply correspondence of the game G. Thus
'(t; y) = fx 2 At(y) : ut(x; y) = wt(y)g for each (t; y) 2 T  EG. We will show that
CS holds with certain restrictions of '.
Recall rst that a compact subset of a Souslin space is metrizable (for the subspace
topology); see Schwartz (1973, p. 96, Theorem 3, and p. 106, Corollary 2). Thus (A2)
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and (A3)(i) imply that the sets Xt are metrizable. Using this fact, it is easily seen
that upper semi-continuity of the payo functions and (A8)(i) imply the following:
If yn ! y in EG, xn 2 At(yn) for each n, and limut(xn; yn)  wt(y),
then x 2 LSxn implies x 2 At(y) and ut(x; y) = limut(xn; yn) = wt(y).
()
From this fact together with (A3)(i) and the hypothesis that the functions wt are lsc
it follows that for any t 2 T , wt is actually continuous and '(t; ) is well-behaved. In
particular, '(t; ) is closed for all t 2 T and y 2 EG. Also, by (A7) and (A8)(ii), for
any y 2 EG, the map t 7! wt(y) is measurable and the correspondence '(; y) has a
measurable graph (see Castaing & Valadier (1977, Lemma III.39 and remarks in the
sequel)16). Thus ' is a Caratheodory correspondence.
Now x any y 2 EG and assume there is no equilibrium strategy prole f such
that e(f) = y. Recall from Lemma 3 that EG is compact and pseudo-metrizable. Let
 be a corresponding pseudo-metric. For n 2 Nnf0g, write B1=n(y) for the open -ball
around y of radius 1=n. Also, for each n 2 Nnf0g and each y0 2 B1=n(y), let
'n(t; y0) = fx 2 At(y0) : ut(x; y0)  wt(y)  1=ng:
We claim that there is an integer n1 > 0 such that (d) in the denition of CS
holds with U = B1=n1(y),  : T ! [ 1;+1] given by (t) = wt(y)   1=n1, and
with T 0  T having outer measure at least 2 n1 . Indeed, otherwise there would be
a sequence hfni of strategy proles, with e(fn) ! y, such that for each n there is a
Tn  T with (Tn)  2 n such that fn(t) 2 'n(t; e(fn)) for almost all t 2 T^ nTn,
and fn(t) 2 co'n(t; e(fn)) for almost all t 2 T nTn. Now by Lemma 4 there is a
strategy prole f , with e(f) = y, such that f(t) 2 LS fn(t) for almost all t 2 T^ ,
and f(t) 2 co LS fn(t) for almost all t 2 T . Noting that the sequence

S
nm Tn

m2N
of sets is decreasing with 
 S
nm Tn
 ! 0, it follows that for almost all t 2 T^ ,
f(t) 2 KLS'n(t; e(fn)), and for almost all t 2 T , f(t) 2 coKLS co'n(t; e(fn)).
By () above, we have KLS'n(t; e(fn))  '(t; y) for all t 2 T . It follows that
f(t) 2 '(t; y) for almost all t 2 T^ . But the same must hold for almost all t 2 T .
Indeed, let t 2 T . As noted above, '(t; y) is closed and by (A10), '(t; y) is convex.
Thus if f(t) =2 '(t; y), then the separation theorem gives an open half-space H  X
(i.e., a set of form H = fy 2 X : p(y) < rg where p is a continuous linear functional on
X, and r a real number) such that '(t; y)  H and f(t) =2 H where H is the closure
of H. Now Xt and hence XtnH are compact, so KLS'n(t; e(fn))  '(t; y) implies
that for large n, 'n(t; e(fn)  H and hence also co'n(t; e(fn)  H. Consequently
KLS co'n(t; e(fn))  H, therefore also coKLS co'n(t; e(fn))  H, so f(t) =2 '(t; y)
implies f(t) =2 coKLS co'n(t; e(fn)).
16We mention that this reference involves a measurable selection theorem.
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Thus f(t) 2 '(t; y) for almost all t 2 T . As e(f) = y, this means f is an equilibrium
strategy prole, and we get a contradiction to the assumption made about y, thus
establishing the claim above.
Choose and x an integer n1 according to this claim. We next claim that there is
an integer n2 > 0 and a T
n2  T such that (T n2) > (T )   2 n1 and such that for
each t 2 T n2 , if y0 2 B1=n2(y) and x 2 '(t; y0) then ut(x; y0) > wt(y)   1=n1. To see
this, for each n 2 Nnf0g let
T n = ft 2 T : infy02B1=n(y)wt(y0)  wt(y)  1=n1g:
As was noted above, the map wt is continuous for each t 2 T , and the map t 7! wt(y0)
is measurable for each y0 2 EG. Also, as EG, being compact and pseudo-metrizable,
is separable, B1=n(y) contains a countable dense subset. Combining these facts, it
follows that the map t 7! infy02B1=n(y)wt(y0) is measurable, and hence that the set
T n is measurable. Now as each wt is continuous, we have T
n " T as n ! 1, and it
follows that (T n) > (T )  2 n1 for n large enough. Thus, since x 2 '(t; y0) means
ut(x; y
0) = wt(y0), n2 and T n2 with the desired properties do exist.
Choose such n2 and T
n2 , and set n3 = maxfn1; n2g. Let 'y be the restriction of '
to T  B1=n3(y). Then, since ' is a Caratheodory correspondence, so is 'y. Modify
the function  of the penultimate paragraph on T nT n2 , if necessary, so as to get
(t) =
(
wt(y)  1=n1 if t 2 T n2
 1 otherwise.
Then (d) of CS still holds with U = B1=n3(y), as 1=n3  1=n1 and (T nT n2) < 2 n1 .
Also, by construction, (a) and (c) of CS hold for U = B1=n3(y), '
y, and . Finally, by
(A10), (b) of CS holds for 'y, too.
11.4.2 Proof of Theorem 5
With the hypothesis that a game be weakly usc, it still follows that () in the proof
of Theorem 4 holds, and therefore that proof still does the job (again with ' being
the best reply correspondence of the game).
11.4.3 Proof of that the game is Section 2 has an equilibrium
Let G = ((T;; ); X; hXt; ut; Atit2T ; e) be the game constructed in Example 1. As
noted in Example 1, this game satises (A1)-(A6), and an equilibrium of this game
gives an equilibrium in the sense of Section 2. The construction of G shows that
(S1) is also satised. If we have shown that G satises CS, then the existence of an
equilibrium for the game in Section 2 follows from Theorem 1.
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To verify CS, let us rst recapitulate from the construction of G as representation
of the game given in Section 2 that Xt = A = fa1; a2g for all t 2 T , that EG is the
unit simplex in R2, that T = T^ , and that At(y) = A for all t 2 T and all y 2 EG.
Note also that wt(y) = maxi=1;2 ut(ai; y) for all t 2 T and all y 2 EG.
Now x any y 2 EG and assume there is no equilibrium strategy prole f such
that e(f) = y.
Let T 1 =ft 2 T : gt(a1; y)> m >gt(a2; y)g, T 2 =ft 2 T : gt(a2; y) >m >gt(a1; y)g,
and for each k 2 Nnf0g, let T 1k = ft 2 T : gt(a1; y) > m + 1=k > gt(a2; y)g and
T 2k = ft 2 T : gt(a2; y) > m+ 1=k > gt(a1; y)g.
We claim that there is a k 2 N and an open neighborhood U1 of y such that for any
y0 2 U1 there is no strategy prole f with (T 1k \ f 1(fa1g)) = (T 2k \ f 1(fa2g)) = 0
and e(f) = y0. Indeed, otherwise there is a sequence hfki of strategy proles such
that e(fk) ! y and such that for each k 2 N, fk(t) = a2 for almost all t 2 T 1k and
fk(t) = a1 for almost all t 2 T 2k . Now by Lemma 4, there is a strategy prole f with
e(f) = y such that f(t) 2 LS fn(t) for almost all t 2 T . As the sequence hT 1k i is
increasing with
S
k1 T
1
k = T
1 we must have f(t) = a2 for almost all t 2 T 1. Similarly,
we have f(t) = a1 for almost all t 2 T 2. By the denition of the sets T 1 and T 2,
and the denition of the payo functions, it follows that ut(f(t); e(f)) = wt(e(f)) for
almost all t 2 T 1 [ T 2. Also by these denitions, and since the set of those t 2 T for
which gt(a1; y) = m or gt(a2; y) = m is a null-set by denition of the functions gt, we
must have ut(f(t); e(f)) = wt(e(f)) for all t 2 T n(T 1 [ T 2). It follows that f is an
equilibrium. But this contradicts the assumption made about y, thus establishing the
claim above.
Choose k and U1 according to the claim. Note that the maps (t; ai; y
0) 7! gt(ai; y0)
are uniformly continuous. There is therefore an open neighborhood U2 of y such that
for all y0 2 U2, gt(a1; y0) > m > gt(a2; y0) for all t 2 T 1k , and gt(a2; y0) > m > gt(a1; y0)
for all t 2 T 2k . Set U = U1 \ U2 and dene ' : T  U  X by setting, for all
(t; y) 2 T  U ,
'(t; y) =
8>><>>:
fa2g if t 2 T 1k ;
fa1g if t 2 T 2k ;
A otherwise:
Furthermore, dene  : T  U ! X by setting, for all (t; y) 2 T  U ,
(t) =
(
1 if t 2 T 1k [ T 2k ;
1  c otherwise:
It is easily seen that the pair ('; ) satises the requirements in condition CS. For
(d) of CS, just note that if f is any strategy prole with e(f) 2 U , then, setting
T 0 = (T 1k \ f 1(fa1g)) [ (T 2k \ f 1(fa2g)), the set T 0 is non-negligible by the choice
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of k and U1, and ut(f(t)) = 1   c for all t 2 T 0 by denition of the payo functions
and of the sets T ik, i = 1; 2.
11.4.4 Proof that the game in Example 2 satises CS
Note rst that if f 2 SG satises e1(f) = 1=2, then f is a Nash equilibrium of this
game if and only if e3(f) = 1=2.
Let y 2 EG be such that there is no equilibrium strategy prole f with e(f) = y.
The case y1 6= 1=2 is easy because, in this case, there is a neighborhood V of y in EG
such that u is continuous on K  V . Hence, assume y1 = 1=2. Since y 6= e(f) for any
equilibrium strategy prole f , then y2 > 0.
Let U = fy0 2 EG : y01 > 0 and y02 > 0g, so that U is a neighborhood of y
in EG, and let  : T ! R be given by (t) = 1=2 for all t 2 T , and ' : T U  X by
'(t; y0) = fa3g for all (t; y0) 2 T U , so that  is measurable and ' is a Caratheodory
correspondence. Clearly, with this choice of ', (a) of CS holds, and since T = ;, so
does (b) of CS. Also, ut(x; y
0)  1=2 for all t 2 T , y0 2 U and x 2 '(t; y0), so (c) of
CS is satised for ' and . But (d) of CS is satised as well: If f is a strategy prole
with e(f) 2 U , then e1(f) > 0 and e2(f) > 0; hence, as ei(f) = (f 1faig), setting
T 0 =
(
f 1(fa1g) if e1(f) < 1=2;
f 1(fa2g) if e1(f)  1=2;
it follows that (T 0) > 0 and that ut(f(t); e(f)) < (t) for all t 2 T 0.
11.5 Proof of Theorem 6
Fix a game G = ((T;; ); X; hXt; ut; Atit2T ; ~e) as described in Section 7 such that
the assumptions of Theorem 6 hold. We will show that for a suitably chosen set C^ as
involved in the denition of externality as stated in 4.1.3, EG is such that there is a
homeomorphism h : ~EG ! EG with e = h  ~e. Given such an h, we may identify ~EG
with EG via h. In particular, we may view the constraint correspondences At as being
dened on EG, and the payo functions ut as being dened on the respective sets
Xt  EG. Moreover, under this identication, CS' is equivalent to CS. The theorem
under proof is therefore implied by Theorem 2, noting that (A11) implies (A6).
The idea to get such a homeomorphism h : ~EG ! EG is simple. Indeed, suppose
that T = T^ and  is an atomless probability measure, that there is common action set
for all players, say Xt = K for all t 2 T where K is a compact metric space, and that
~e(f) = f 1 for each f 2 SG, ignoring the attribute space C. This is just the standard
scenario of large games. Now ~EG  ~e(SG) is equal to the space M1+(K) of Borel
probability measures on K with the narrow topology, and in particular is compact
(note that as  is atomless, every y 2 M1+(K) is the distribution of some f 2 SG).
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Choose a countable family hpiii2i of continuous functions dened onK which separate
the points of M1+(K). For each i 2 I, dene qi : T K ! R by qi(t; x) = pi(x). Let
C^ = fqi : i 2 Ig, and let e and EG be dened relative to C^ according to Section 4.1.3.
Dene h : ~EG ! RI by setting h(y) = h
R
pidyii2I . Evidently h  ~e = e and it follows
that h is a bijection from ~EG onto EG. By denition of the narrow topology, h is
continuous, and since ~EG is compact, h must be a homeomorphism.
But for the proof of Theorem 6, this argument needs to be expanded. In particular,
it is not assumed in Theorem 6 that the action sets of the players are included in a
common compact subset of X. Further, we have to take care of the attribute space C
which is involved in the denition of the map ~e. We proceed as follows.
Recall rst that any Hausdor locally convex space is completely regular. Hence
by (A2) and (A12)(i), XC is a completely regular Souslin space. By what was noted
in footnote 15, there is a countable family hpiii2I of continuous bounded functions on
XC which separates the points of XC. We may assume that the family hpiii2I is
stable with respect to multiplication. Then by Schwartz (1973, p. 388, Corollary 1),
the family of maps  7! R pid : M1+(X  C) ! R, i 2 I, separates the points of
M1+(XC). For each j 2 J and i 2 I, dene a map qij :  G\ (T^ X)! R by setting
qij(t; x) =
8<: 1(Tj)pi(x; c(t)) if t 2 Tj0 if t 2 T^ nTj
(where the sets Tj are the subsets of T^ from the denition of the externality map ~e).
Let C^ = fqij : i 2 I; j 2 Jg, and with this choice of C^ let e : SG ! SG RC^ be the
externality mapping of the general model as developed in Section 4.1. Note that C^
satises the requirements in that model; in particular, C^ is countable. As in Section 4.1,
let EG = e(SG), endowed with the same topology as there.
Dene h0 :
Q
t2 T Xt 
 
M1+(X  C)
J !Qt2 T Xt  RC^ by setting
h0
 
z; hjij2J

=

z;
Z
XC
pidj

i2I

j2J

; z 2
Y
t2 T
Xt ; hjij2J 2
 
M1+(XC)
J
:
Recall from Section 7 that we are viewing eachXt as being endowed with the subspace
topology dened from X, M1+(X  C) as being endowed with the narrow topology,
and all products involving these spaces as being endowed with the product topology.
Thus h0 is continuous. Note also that by choice of the family hpiii2I , h0 is an injection.
Let h be the restriction of h0 to ~EG.
For each f 2 SG and each j 2 J , set j(f) = (1=(Tj))(jTj)  (f jTj ; cjTj) 1. Note
that for any f 2 SG, and each i 2 I and j 2 J , we haveZ
XC
pidj(f) =
Z
Tj
1
(Tj)
pi(f(t); c(t))d(t) =
Z
T^
qij(t; f(t))d(t):
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Using this fact, it follows that e = h ~e, by the denitions of the three maps involved.
In particular, as EG = e(SG) by denition of EG, h is a surjection from ~EG onto EG.
We next show that for every j 2 J there is a compact set Kj M1+(X C) such
that f(1=(Tj))(jTj)  (f jTj ; cjTj) 1 : f 2 SGg  Kj. To this end, let  : Tj  X  C
be dened by setting (t) = Xt  fc(t)g for each t 2 T^ and note that  takes non-
empty compact values. As C is a Souslin space according to (A12)(i), measurability of
the map c (Assumption (A12)(ii)) implies that the correspondence t 7! fc(t)g has a
measurable graph (see Castaing & Valadier (1977, p. 74)), and according to (A3)(ii),
so does the correspondence t 7! Xt. By the fact that B(X  C)  B(X) 
 B(C), it
is now elementary to check that  has a measurable graph. Fix any j 2 J and let
j be the restriction of  to Tj. Note that j has again a measurable graph. Let Rj
denote the set of all Young measures g from Tj to X  C with supp g(t)  (t) for
almost all t 2 Tj, endowed with the narrow topology for Young measures (cf. 11.3.2).
For each g 2 Rj , dene g 2 M1+(X) by setting g(B) = 1(Tj)
R
Tj
g(t)(B)d(jTj)(t)
for every B 2 B(X). (That g is indeed countably additive may be easily seen with
the help of the monotone convergence theorem). Note that, for any f 2 SG, setting
g(t) = (f(t);c(t)) for t 2 Tj, where (f(t);c(t)) is Dirac measure at (f(t); c(t)), denes an
element g of Rj for which g = (1=(Tj))(jTj)  (f jTj ; cjTj) 1. Now the map g 7! g
from Rj to M1+(X) is continuous for the narrow topology of M1+(X) (see Balder
(2002, proof of Theorem 3.1.1)), and thus the assertion follows from Theorem 10 in
11.3.2.
Now by (A3),
Q
t2 T Xt is compact. From this and the previous paragraph it follows
that there is a compact K Qt2 T Xt  M1+(X C)J such that ~EG  K. The facts
thatK is compact and h0 is a continuous injection dened on
Q
t2 T Xt
 
M1+(XC)
J
mean that the restriction of h0 to K is a homeomorphism from K onto h0(K). As
~EG  K and h is the restriction of h0 to ~EG, it follows that h is a homeomorphism
from ~EG onto h( ~EG) (recall that the topology of ~EG is the subspace topology dened
from
Q
t2 T Xt
 
M1+(XC)
J
). By what was stated in Remark 6, (A11) means that
the feeble topology on SG 
Q
t2 T Xt, which is involved in the denition of EG, is the
same as the product topology of
Q
t2 T Xt. By the fact that h( ~EG) = EG, we may now
conclude that h is a homeomorphism from ~EG to EG. This completes the proof.
11.6 Proof of Theorem 7
Recall rst from the proof of Theorem 6 that, for some choice of an externality map e
as dened in Section 4.1, ~EG  ~e(SG) may be homeomorphically identied with
EG  e(SG). Consequently, Lemmas 3 and 4 continue to hold with ~e in place of e, and
~EG in place of EG. In particular, ~EG is pseudo-metrizable, therefore rst-countable.
(In fact, by (A11), ~EG is metrizable.)
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Let y 2 ~EG be such that there is no equilibrium strategy prole f of G with
~e(f) = y. We claim that there is an " > 0 and a neighborhood V of y such that if
f 2 SG satises ~e(f) 2 V and f(t) 2 At(~e(f)) for almost all t 2 T , there is T 0  T
with outer measure larger than " such that ut(f(t); ~e(f)) < wt(y)  " for all t 2 T 0.
Indeed, otherwise there is a sequence hfki in SG with ~e(fk) ! y such that for
each k, fk(t) 2 At(~e(fk)) for almost all t 2 T , and for some Tk  T with (Tk) < 2 k,
ut(fk(t); ~e(fk))  wt(y) 2 k for all t 2 TnTk. Now the sequence

S
nk Tn

k2N of sets is
decreasing with 
 S
nm Tn
! 0, and thus we must have limn ut(fn(t); ~e(fn))  wt(y)
for almost every t 2 T . Lemma 4 gives an f 2 SG such that f(t) 2 LS fn(t) for almost
all t 2 T^ and such that ~e(f) = y. Note that ~e(fk)! ~e(f) implies f(t) = limk fk(t) for
t 2 T ; see the paragraph following the statement of Assumption (A11). Thus we must
have f(t) 2 LS fn(t) for almost all t 2 T . By BRC, it follows that f is an equilibrium
of G, and as ~e(f) = y we thus get a contradiction to the assumption made about y.
Fix a neighborhood V of y and a number " > 0 as just established. Relative to
this ", let U , ', and  be chosen according to GPS. Then (U;'; ) satises (1)-(3) in
CS'. By (A13), (4) in CS' is equivalent to the following statement: Whenever f is a
strategy prole with ~e(f) 2 U and f(t) 2 At(~e(f)) for almost all t 2 T , then there
is a non-negligible set T 0  T such that ut(f(t); ~e(f)) < (t) for all t 2 T 0. Thus,
shrinking the set U , if necessary, so that U  V , (4) in CS' must hold because of (d)
in GPS.
11.7 Proofs related to Section 9
11.7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Here is a short roadmap. Lemmas 5 to 8 provide auxiliary results. Verication of BRC
will be done in Lemma 9, and verication of GPS in Lemmas 10 and 11.
To give an overview of the argument establishing BRC, let f and fn, n 2 N, be
strategy proles. BRC requires that if (a)-(c) in its statement hold for these strategy
proles, then in the limit f almost every player realizes a best reply in At(~e(f)) against
~e(f). That this requirement is satised for players in T^ follows because these players
have continuous payo functions and well-behaved budget constraint correspondences
(the latter fact will be established in Lemma 8). For player t, i.e., the government,
a diculty arises because the payo function ut need not be usc (see the example
prior to the statement of Theorem 1). Resolving this diculty needs some work which
occupies the main part of the proof of Lemma 9. The argument, which uses Lemma 7,
consists in showing that if almost all players in T^ realize a best reply in the limit f ,
then this must hold for player t, too.
To establish GPS, we apply (T7) to deal with player t. The main step concerning
the players in T^ is isolated in Lemma 10. The idea is to show that given a player
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t 2 T^ and an externality y = (; ), the value wt(y) can be approximated by the
payo of an action that is available in the budget sets for all tax functions 0 near
to . To do so, we will use fact that a tax function, being non-decreasing, can have
at most countably many discontinuity points, and the fact, established in Lemma 6,
that the map (; z) 7! (z), which sends tax functions and pre-tax incomes to after
tax incomes, is continuous at a point (; z) whenever z is a continuity point of .
Lemma 5.  is compact.
Proof. Let hki be a sequence in . As  is uniformly bounded, we may assume
k(n) ! a for some number a. Now using the version of Helly's selection theorem
in Billingsley (1968, p. 227), we may nd a  2  and a subsequence hii of hki
such that (n)  a and i(z) ! (z) if z 2 (0; n) is a continuity point of . De-
ne 1 : [0; n] ! R+ by setting 1(n) = a and 1(z) = (z) for z 2 [0; n). Then
i(n) ! 1(n), and as a  (n), 1 is still in . Being non-decreasing, 1 has only
countably many discontinuity points, and it follows that hii converges to  pointwise
almost everywhere with respect to Lebesgue measure. Using Lebesgue's dominated
convergence theorem, we may conclude that (i; 1)! 0.
Lemma 6. Suppose k !  in  (i.e., (; k) ! 0) and zk ! z in [0; n]. Then
(z)  limk k(zk). If z > 0 and z is a continuity point of , then (z) = limk k(zk).
Proof. If z = n, then, as k !  implies k(n)! (n) by denition of , we have
limk k(zk)  limk k(n) = (n);
just because the members of  are non-decreasing.
Now by the fact that the members of  are right-continuous and non-decreasing,
it is elementary to check that k(z
)! (z) if z 2 (0; n) is a continuity point of ,
and as  can have only countably many discontinuity points, the set of continuity
points of  is dense in [0; n]. Using these facts, we can continue as follows.
Suppose z < n. Then, for any continuity point z of  with z 2 (z; n],
limk k(zk)  limk k(z) = (z);
and thus limk k(zk)  (z) by right-continuity of .
Suppose z > 0 is a continuity point of . Then given " > 0 there is a continuity
point z of  with z < z such that (z) > (z)  ". Now
limk k(zk)  limk k(z) = (z) > (z)  ":
As " > 0 was arbitrary, limk k(zk)  (z).
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For the next lemma, recall that if  2 K then ^ 2 K^ denotes the distribution of
the map (u; n;m; l) 7! nl : CMN ! [0; n], and that the map  7! ^ is continuous.
Lemma 7. Let k !  in  and k !  in K. Then (a)
R
u((nl); l)d(u; n;m; l) 
limk
R
u(k(nl); l)dk(u; n;m; l) and (b)
R
((z))d^(z)  limk
R
(k(z))d^k(z) if
 : [0; m]! R is continuous and non-decreasing.
Proof. (b) Note that k !  implies ^k ! ^k. Let  be Lebesgue measure on [0; 1].
By Skorokhod's Theorem we can select measurable maps h, hk : [0; 1]! [0; n], k 2 N,
such that ^ =   h 1 and ^k =   h 1k for each k and such that hk(a) ! h(a) for
almost all a 2 [0; 1]. Using Fatou's lemma, Lemma 6, and the properties of , we get
limk
Z
(k(z))d^k(z) = limk
Z
(k(hk(a)))d(a) 
Z
limk (k(hk(a)))d(a)

Z
((h(a)))d(a) =
Z
((z))d^(z):
This proves (b). Part (a) follows similarly, but this time with the maps h and hk going
to C^N M N , observing that if (uk; nk;mk; lk)! (u; n;m; l) in C^N M N
and k !  in , then limk uk(k(nklk); lk)  u((nl); l), by Lemma 6 and because
(u; n;m; l) 2 C^ N M N implies that u is non-decreasing in m.
Lemma 8. For each t 2 T , the correspondence At is well-behaved. Furthermore, for
each y 2 ~EG, the correspondence t 7! At(y) has a measurable graph.
Proof. It follows from (T5) that At is well-behaved. Consider any t 2 T^ . As (z) 2 R+
for all z 2 [0; n] and  2 , we have (0; 0) 2 At(y) for all y 2 ~EG, i.e., At takes
non-empty values. Let y = (; ) 2 ~EG, (m; l) 2 M  L, and suppose h(k; k)i
and h(mk; lk)i are sequences in ~EG and M  L, respectively, with (k; k) ! (; ),
(mk; lk) ! (m; l) and (mk; lk) 2 At(k; k) for all k. Then by Lemma 6, we have
m = limkmk  limk (ntlk)  (ntl), so (m; l) 2 At(; ). Thus At is closed and
therefore well-behaved as M  L is compact.
Let y = (; ) 2 ~EG. To show that t 7! At(y) has a measurable graph, it suces
to show that  A is measurable, where  A is the graph of the restriction of t 7! At(y)
to T^ . Dene p : T^ML! R by p(t;m; l) = (ntl) m for all (t;m; l) 2 T^ML.
Then p is measurable and  A = p
 1(R+). Thus  A is measurable.
Lemma 9. The game satises BRC.
Proof. Let f 2 SG and hfki a sequence in SG such that (a) ~e(fk) ! ~e(f) and, for
almost all t 2 T , (b) fk(t) 2 At(~e(fk)) for all k 2 N, (c) f(t) 2 LS fk(t), and
(d) limk ut(fk(t); ~e(fk))  wt(~e(f)). We have to show that for almost all t 2 T ,
f(t) 2 At(~e(f)) and ut(f(t); ~e(f(t))) = wt(~e(f)).
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By Lemma 8, (b) and (c) imply that f(t) 2 At(~e(f)) for almost all t 2 T . As ~ut
is continuous for each t 2 T^ , (c) implies ~ut(f(t)) 2 LS ~ut(fk(t)) for almost all t 2 T^ .
Hence, by the denitions of ut and wt for t 2 T^ , (d) implies ut(f(t); ~e(f(t))) = wt(~e(f))
for almost all t 2 T^ .
It remains to see that ut(; ~e(f)) = wt(~e(f)). To this end, set  = ^  (n^; f^) 1,
and k = ^  (n^; f^k) 1 for k 2 N. Write k = fk(t), k 2 N, and  = f(t).
Now (a) implies both k !  and k ! , so
R
nldk(u; n;m; l)!
R
nld(u; n;m; l)
and
R
mdk(u; n;m; l)!
R
md(u; n;m; l). Moreover, from Lemma 7(b), with  there
being the identity on [0; m], we have
R
(nl)d(u; n;m; l)  limk
R
k(nl)dk(u; n;m; l).
Next note that for all k, we have
R
mdk(u; n;m; l) 
R
k(nl)dk(u; n;m; l) as
fk(t) 2 At(~e(fk)) for almost all t 2 T^ . Also,
R
md(u; n;m; l) =
R
(nl)d(u; n;m; l)
because for almost all t 2 T^ , both f(t) 2 At(~e(f)) and ut(f(t); ~e(f(t))) = wt(~e(f)),
and because the functions ut are strictly increasing in m. Hence, by the last two facts
stated in the previous paragraph,
R
k(nl)dk(u; n;m; l)!
R
(nl)d(u; n;m; l).
Finally, note that by (T7) and the denition of ut, we have wt(~e(f))  0 since
v is non-negative by (T6). Thus limk ut(k; ~e(fk))  wt(~e(f)) implies that we must
have ut(k; ~e(fk)) = v(k; k) as well as
R
k(nl)dk(u; n;m; l) =
R
nldk(u; n;m; l)
for all suciently large k, again by denition of ut and non-negativity of v. By the
fact that
R
nldk(u; n;m; l) !
R
nld(u; n;m; l) and the conclusion of the previous
paragraph, it follows that
R
(nl)d(u; n;m; l) =
R
nld(u; n;m; l) and hence that
ut(; ~e(f)) = v(; ). As v is usc by (T6), we can conclude that
ut(; ~e(f)) = v(; )  limk v(k; k) = limk ut(k; ~e(fk))  wt(~e(f));
so that ut(; ~e(f)) = wt(~e(f)). This completes the proof.
For the following, recall that ut(x; y) = ~ut(x) for all t 2 T^ , x 2ML and y 2 ~EG.
Lemma 10. Given y = (; ) 2 ~EG and " > 0, there are measurable maps  : T^ ! R
and f : T^ !M  L and a neighborhood W of  in  such that:
1. f(t) 2 At(y0) for all t 2 T^ and all y0 = (0; ) 2 ~EG with 0 2 W .
2. ut(f(t); y
0)  (t) for all t 2 T^ and all y0 = (0; ) 2 ~EG with 0 2 W .
3. For some T"  T^ with (T") < ", (t)  wt(y)  " for all t 2 T^ nT".
Proof. Let y = (; ) 2 ~EG and " > 0 be given. Note rst that (T1) implies that if
h : T^ ! M  L is measurable, then so is the map t 7! ~ut(h(t)) : T^ ! R. Moreover,
(T1) also implies that the map (t; x) 7! ~ut(x) : T^ M L! R is measurable. Thus,
by Lemma 8, since ~ut is continuous for each t 2 T^ , the map t 7! wt(y) is measurable
and there is a measurable g = (m; l) : T^ ! M  L such that m(t)  (ntl(t)) and
~ut(g(t)) = wt(y) for all t 2 T^ (see Castaing & Valadier (1977, Lemma III.39 and the
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remarks following its proof)). Let D  N be the set of discontinuity points of , and
note that D is countable as  is non-decreasing. Let D1 = fd1; d2; : : : g be a countable
dense subset of N such that D \D1 = ;. Let T1 = ft 2 T^ : m(t) > 0; nt > 0; nt =2 Dg
and note that T1 is a measurable subset of T^ . For i, j 2 Nnf0g, set
Tij =

t 2 T1 : di=nt  1; ~ut
 
j 1
j
m(t); di=nt

> wt(y)  "; j 1j m(t) < (di)
	
:
Then Tij is measurable, and by the denition of T1 and the fact that  is non-decreasing
and right-continuous, we have
S
i;j2Nnf0g Tij = T1. We can therefore nd a measurable
map g1 = (m1; l1) : T1 ! M  L such that for all t 2 T1, ~ut(g1(t)) > wt(y)   ",
m1(t) < (ntl1(t)), and ntl1(t) 2 D1. Now as each d 2 D1 is a continuity point of ,
and as D1 is countable, Lemma 6 implies that there are a neighborhoodW of  and a
measurable T"  T1, with (T") < ", such that m1(t) < 0(ntl1(t)) for each t 2 T1nT"
and 0 2 W . Now dene f : T^ ! M  L by setting f(t) = g1(t) if t 2 T1nT" and
f(t) = (0; 0) otherwise, and  : T^ ! R by setting (t) = ~ut(f(t)) for all t 2 T^ .
Concerning t 2 T^ nT1, note that if m(t) = 0 then wt(y) = ~ut(0; 0) by (T2), and that
ft 2 T^ : nt 2 D or nt = 0g is a null set by (T4), as D is countable.
Lemma 11. The game satised GPS.
Proof. Let y = (; ) 2 ~EG and " > 0. Let W , f , and  be chosen according to
Lemma 10, and let O and  be chosen according to Assumption (T7). Set U = WO.
Dene a correspondence ' : T U  (M L)[ as follows. Given y0 = (0; 0) 2 U ,
set '(t; y0) = f (0)g, and set '(t; y0) = ff(t)g for each t 2 T^ . Dene a function
 : T ! R by setting (t) = wt(y)  ", and by setting (t) = (t) for each t 2 T^ . It
is readily seen that (U;'; ) satises the requirements in GPS.
11.7.2 Proof of Theorem 8
We will establish Theorem 8 by appeal to Weierstrass' theorem. The main task is
to nd a representation of the government's optimization problem so that we have
both continuity of the objective function and compactness of the choice set. We will
obtain such a representation in terms of the game G = ((T;; ); X; hXt; ut; Atit2T ; ~e)
specied in Section 9.
We start by recording the following fact.
Lemma 12. For all y 2 ~EG, wt is lsc at y for almost all t 2 T^ .
Proof. Fix y = (; ) 2 ~EG. Clearly, if wt(y) = ~ut(0; 0) then wt is lsc at y because
(0; 0) 2 At(y0) for every y0 2 ~EG. Now by the proof of Lemma 10, for almost all t 2 T ,
if wt(y) > ~ut(0; 0) then, given " > 0, there is a point (m; l) 2 M  L, with m < ntl
and ~ut(m; l) > wt(y) ", such that ntl is a continuity point of . In view of Lemma 6,
this shows that the assertion holds.
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Now let
~S(E) = f~e(f) : f is an equilibrium of Gg
and let F : ~S(E) ! R be dened by setting F (; ) = R u(m; l)d(u; n;m; l) for all
y = (; ) 2 ~S(E). Consider the problem maxy2 ~S(E) F (y). By change of variables,
this problem has a solution if and only if the problem maxf2S(E)
R
T^
~ut(f(t))d(t) has
a solution, where S(E) is the set of all equilibria of G. As pointed out in Section 9,
every equilibrium of the game G denes an equilibrium of the economy E, with the
same utilities for the individuals in T^ , and vice versa. Thus it suces to show that
the problem maxy2 ~S(E) F (y) has a solution.
To this end, note by Theorem 9, ~S(E) is nonempty. Moreover, as a subset of the
compact and metrizable space ~EG, ~S(E) is closed and therefore compact. To see this,
let y 2 ~EG and hyki a sequence in ~E(G) such that yk ! y. For each k 2 N, let fk be
an equilibrium of G such that ~e(fk) = yk. By Lemma 4 in 11.4.1, there is an f 2 SG
such that ~e(f) = y and f(t) 2 LS fk(t) for almost all t 2 T . Since wt is lsc for almost
all t 2 T (by Lemma 12 and (T7)), we must have
limk ut(fk(t); ~e(fk)) = limk wt(~e(fk))  wt(~e(f))
for almost all t 2 T . It now follows from Lemma 9 that f is an equilibrium of G, and
thus y 2 ~S(E).
Finally, note that by (T1) the map (u; n;m; l) 7! u(m; l) : ~S(E)! R is continuous.
As ~S(E) is compact, it follows rst that the map F is continuous, and then that the
problem maxy2 ~S(E) F (y) has a solution. This completes the proof.
11.7.3 Lemmas for Examples 6 and 7
Recall for the proofs below that if  2 K then ^ 2 K^ denotes the distribution of the
map (u; n;m; l) 7! nl : C M N ! [0; n], and that the map  7! ^ is continuous.
Lemma 13. Let  and v be as in Example 6. Then (T5)-(T7) hold. Moreover,
(1) holds for any equilibrium (; g) of E = h(T^ ; ^; ^);M; L;N; n^;;; h~ut; ntit2T^ i.
Proof. For (T5), note rst that as  is concave,  has convex values. To show that 
is well-behaved, it suces to show that  is closed. To see this, note rst that the two
functions  and  must be continuous. Because, in addition,  is increasing, Lemma 7
in Section 11.7.1 implies that the map (; ) 7! R ((z))d^(z) :  K ! R is usc.
Using these facts, in conjunction with the fact that  and K are endowed with the
narrow topology, is easily seen that  has a closed graph.
Concerning (T7), x  2 K and " > 0. Let O = K and dene  : O !  by setting
 (0) =
 R
zd^0(z)

N for all 
0 2 O, where N is the characteristic function of N .
Then  is continuous and (T7)(ii) holds. Also,
R
( (0)(z))d^0(z) = 
 R
zd^0(z)

.
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Using this fact, it follows that (T7)(i) holds. Finally, it is clear that (T7)(iii) holds,
as v constantly takes value 0.
As for the last part of the lemma, suppose (; g) is an equilibrium of E and set
 = ^(c; g) 1. Assume rst that   R zd^(z)+R (l)d(u; n;m; l) > 0. By (a) of the
equilibrium denition, (1) is equivalent to
R
((z))d^(z) + 
R
(l)d(u; n;m; n) 
(1  )  R zd^(z). Thus (1) holds, since  2 () by denition of equilibrium.
Assume 
 R
zd^(z)

+
R
(l)d(u; n;m; l)  0. Note that (b) of the equilibrium
denition implies ((ntl(t)))+ (l(t))  0 for almost all t 2 T^ , because 0  (0)
and (0)+ (0) = 0. Thus, by concavity of  and by (a) of the equilibrium denition,
0 
Z
((z))d^(z) +
Z
(l)d(u; n;m; l)
 
Z
(z)d^(z)

+
Z
(l)d(u; n;m; l)
= 
Z
zd^(z)

+
Z
(l)d(u; n;m; l)  0:
Now this shows that the rst two sums must be zero, from which (1) follows.
Lemma 14. Let  and v be as in Example 7 and assume that ~ut(; l) is concave for
all t 2 T^ and l 2 L. Then (T6) and (T7) hold.
Proof. To see that (T6) holds, note rst that by Lemma 7 in 11.7.1, v is usc. Now if
 2  is continuous, then the bounded map (u; n;m; l) 7! u((nl); l) : CML! R
is continuous, and hence the map  7! R u((nl); l)d(u; n;m; l)  v(; ) : K ! R is
continuous (by denition of the narrow topology). By the assumption that ~ut(; l) is
concave for all t 2 T^ and l 2 L, it follows that v(; ) is quasi-concave for all  2 K.
Finally, by (T2), v(; )  0 for all (; ) 2 K. Thus (T6) holds.
As for (T7), x  2 K and " > 0. Recall that 0 is the element of  satisfying
0(z) = z for all z 2 [0; n]. Let B = f 2 :
R
(z)d^(z) =
R
zd^(z)g and note that
0 2 B. Let S = f 2 B : (; 0)  "(^)g (recall that  is the metric on  dened in
Section 9). Set s = supfv(; ) :  2 Sg.
Suppose
R
zd^(z) = 0. Then v(0; ) = s. Since 0 is continuous, by (T6) there is
a neighborhood O of  such that v(0; 
0) > v(0; ) " for all 0 2 O. Set  (0) = 0
for all 0 2 O. Evidently  is as required in (T7).
Suppose
R
zd^(z) > 0 which implies "(^) > 0. It suces to nd a  2 B with the
following properties: (a) v(; ) > s  ", (b) (; 0) < "(^), and (c)  is continuous.
Indeed, given such a , by (c) we have
R
(z)d^0(z) > 0 for all 0 in some
neighborhood O of , and thus
R
(0)(z)d^0(z) =
R
zd^0(z) for some number
(0) > 0. Note that the map 0 7! (0) is continuous with () = 1. Consider
a sequence hki in O with k ! ; in particular, (k) ! 1. Now (c) implies that
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we have uk((k)(nklk); lk)) ! u((nl); l) whenever (uk; nk;mk; lk) ! (u; n;m; l).
Using Billingsley (1968, Theorem 5.5, p. 34) and the denition of v, it follows that
v((k); k) ! v(; ). In view of this and (a), shrinking the set O, if necessary,
we have v((0); 0) > s   " for all 0 2 O. Shrinking the set O another time, if
necessary, (b) implies that we can arrange to also have ((0); 0) < "(^0) for each
0 2 O, using the fact that the maps 0 7! ^0 and ^0 7! "(^0) are continuous, together
with continuity of a metric. Now dene  : O !  by setting  (0) = (0) for each
0 2 O. Then  is as required in (T7).
Now to nd a  as desired, choose some 1 2 S such that (a) holds for 1. Note
that the function  7! v(1 + (1   )0; ) : [0; 1] ! R is continuous, and that
(1+(1 )0; 0) < "(^) for each 0 <  < 1, by denition of the metric . Thus,
by the denition of 0, there is a 2 2 S such that (b) holds in addition to (a).
We claim there is a sequence hki of continuous elements of  with k(z)! 2(z)
for each z 2 [0; n]. Indeed, let D = fzi : i 2 Ng be a countable dense subset of
[0; n] with n 2 D. For each i; n 2 N choose a continuous element 0i;n in  such that
0i;n  2 and 0i;n(zi) < 2(zi) + 1=(n+ 1), using the fact that 2, being in , is non-
decreasing and right-continuous. Re-index the family h0i;nii;n2N as a sequence h0jij2N.
For each k 2 N, let k be the pointwise inmum of the set f0j : j  kg. Then each k
is still continuous and non-decreasing, hence in , and we have k(zi) ! 2(zi) for
each zi 2 D. By the choice of D, and because 2 is right-continuous and each k is
non-decreasing and satises k  2, it follows that k(z)! 2(z) for each z 2 [0; n].
Now by Lebesgue's dominated convergence theorem and the fact that 2 2 S  B,
there is a sequence hki of real numbers, with k ! 1, such that kk 2 B for
each k. Another invocation of Lebesgue's dominated convergence theorem shows that
v(kk; ) ! v(2; ), so kk satises (a) if k is large enough. Finally, once more
using Lebesgue's dominated convergence theorem, we have (2; kk) ! 0 by de-
nition of , so the fact that 2 satises (b) implies that (b) is also satised by kk if
k is large enough. Thus, for large k, kk is in B and satises all of (a)-(c) above.
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